

be a median average of \$2,500 more a year for these veterans. Assuming even a very conservative average of 25 productive years from these GI bill educated veterans, this means an increased income of \$62,500 in lifetime earnings.

Since about half of the eligible veterans take advantage of their educational benefits when offered, this means that we are passing up the opportunity for 2½ million veterans to benefit the national economy as much as \$156 billion. The argument that "we cannot afford the GI bill" ignores the future benefits that would accrue through this additional income. And it flies in the face of all previous experience with the GI bills.

Measured in another way, the GI bill has been a large factor in providing this country with its essential leadership. Almost 10 percent of all U.S. Senators and 11.5 percent of the Members of the House of Representatives utilized their educational benefits under the GI bill. Add to this two Cabinet officers and seven Governors and this single piece of legislation has given a significant boost to the quality of leadership which we have in this country.

This impressive progress of the World War II and Korean veterans underscores the problems cold war veterans now encounter. These cold war veterans are the victims of a great inequality; only 44 percent of the draft-eligible men ever see active duty in the cold war, and they are placed at a 2- to 4-year disadvantage in their competitive standing with their peer group. These young men enter the service unskilled and upon discharge find themselves in the same plight—untrained, unemployable, and unable to compete for scarce jobs with the 56 percent of their age group who do not see military duty.

Last year there was an increase of \$2 million in unemployment compensation paid to veterans—a total of \$96 million, which if invested in education would have brought profits to our country. The discouraging aspect of this problem is that with the increase in automation and the continued necessity for education, this situation shows little prospect of improvement in the future.

The only solution is to provide these young veterans with the means of escaping the category of "uneducated, therefore unemployable." We must provide the arms of education before we can expect this group to take their place in the fight against unemployment and poverty.

It is essential for our Nation to provide readjustment assistance to these veterans in the pursuit of equality for all. These GI's should be leading the war on poverty, instead of being objects of it.

For these and many other good reasons, I have joined 38 other Senators in cosponsoring a cold war GI bill which would provide readjustment benefits to our veterans similar to those provided by previous GI bills. This bill would assist our cold war veterans in adjusting from military service to civilian life without the hazards of experimentation.

The bill is designed to render assistance to veterans who have served in the military for more than 180 days between January 31, 1955, and July 1, 1967. As with former GI bills, it is anticipated that the cost will be entirely self-liquidating through additional taxes paid by the veterans who benefit from the bill. Hence the bill is not a bonus bill, but it is readjustment training to help our veterans help our country in the future as they have done in the past.

Despite the fact that the cost of this bill would be only three-fifths of 1 percent of the total military budget, the Defense Department and the Bureau of the Budget have joined forces in opposition to the bill. Their objection is that the program would discourage military men from making a career out of the armed services.

Besides lacking any proof for this assertion, it fails to coincide with the fact that with

increased benefits a military career becomes more attractive.

One of the major improvements of this bill over previous GI bills is that a serviceman does not lose his educational benefits because of extended service. Although that was sometimes the case under other GI bills, under the cold war GI bill a serviceman does not face this choice just because he continues to defend his country.

As this bill prepares our returning veterans for better roles in our expanding economy, it can make a major contribution for furthering the progress of our country. It is inconsistent for the United States as an international leader to boast of our defense facing the Communists around the perimeter of the free world, and then to cast our returning veterans out upon society, unskilled, uneducated, and unarmed for civilian pursuits.

In celebrating the 20th anniversary year of the original GI bill, I think that the experience and principles of our Nation demand that the cold war GI bill be written into public law by the hand of justice. I hope the Congress enacts this act of justice.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TUESDAY NEXT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Tuesday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AID PROPOSALS

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the President's message on foreign aid.

Our foreign aid program must be founded, first, on the interests of the United States—upon what it contributes to our security and freedom, and the security and freedom of other free countries. It embraces also our concern that developing countries will be strengthened in their independence and will be enabled to raise the living standards of their people.

I believe that the decisions and recommendations of the President in his message on foreign aid were based on these premises, and could go far in removing some of the defects of our foreign aid program—defects which have brought it to the verge of rejection.

Among his important recommendations is the President's emphasis on aid to Latin America. The security of the Western Hemisphere is essential, and the Alliance for Progress expresses our tradition of friendship for our neighbors, and our shared concern in the living standards of their people.

The President's recommendation that greater emphasis be placed on multilateral aid through the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the Inter-American Bank—to all of which we contribute—reflects the growing recognition that these professional organizations can make better judgments on the value of specific projects, and more effectively require self-help and reform on the part of recipient countries, than can our Agency for International Development.

I also hope that AID will carry out his recommendations that emphasis be placed on the development of agriculture, rather than industrial development, in many of the countries which seek our aid. For food is the first requirement of any country in raising the living standards of its people.

Even with the important improvements that the President has recommended, I hope very much that the President will take other steps to assure that our aid program is being used effectively. For, if it is not effective, it is my belief that this program will die.

Two years ago, a committee headed by Gen. Lucius Clay made an examination of the foreign aid program in its totality, and made many valuable recommendations. But I do not believe that the effectiveness of the program can be assured until a further step is taken. That necessary step is a searching examination of the program in specific countries, by committees composed of experienced private citizens and members of the AID organization.

I recognize that such examinations could not be accomplished quickly, but they could be started with respect to the 12 or 15 countries which receive the major part of our aid, and in others where there are specific problems which I shall discuss.

Two years ago, Congress adopted an amendment which I offered to the Foreign Aid Act, recommending that these specific examinations be undertaken. The President noted his interest in this recommendation in his message to Congress last year. I have no doubt that it will be implemented.

I make one further suggestion. It is that the President shall not make available to other countries any further aid, except to fulfill commitments and for humanitarian purposes, until an assessment of the effectiveness of our aid program be made in a number of countries receiving the major part of our foreign aid. This would give an opportunity, also, to withhold aid from those countries which are using their resources, supplemented by our foreign aid, to provide weapons and supplies to others for aggressive purposes, and from those countries which condone the destruction of our property, or its seizure without provision for payment.

To withhold aid for a time, and I mean a considerable time, until this assessment is made, would not, as some countries claim, be an interference in their internal affairs, or the offer of aid "with strings." It is our program, and the resources of our people that are extended.

We have the right to insist that our aid be used properly, and that the United States be treated with respect. Withholding aid to all countries for a time, until we know that it is being used effectively, would let all countries know that our aid program, established for good purposes, is our program, and not theirs; that it is not fair to our people who must pay the bill, or to their people whose welfare is its object, unless it is used effectively; and as a nation which has shown restraint and decency in its

international relations, that we have the right to expect the same treatment and respect.

I have always believed that a President, at the beginning of his administration, has the great opportunity to break away from old molds and establish policies that will be more effective and will assert the dignity as well as the good purposes of our policy. I shall never forget the statement made to me years ago by the former Premier of Italy, Mr. DeGasperi, who, in speaking of our foreign aid program, said:

No other country in all the history of the world could do, or would do, what the United States is doing.

I have confidence that the President is moving to make our foreign aid program effective and consonant with its purposes and with the dignity of the United States.

I repeat my chief recommendation: that, with the exception of commitments which we have made, and for humanitarian purposes, we should not extend any further aid to any country until an assessment is made of the effectiveness of the program in the countries which are receiving the major part of this aid, and in those countries which are condoning the destruction of our property, and which will not adhere to the international standards of conduct and decency to which our country adheres.

I thank the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGovern] for his courtesy in yielding to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURRICK in the chair). The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I want to take a hardheaded, realistic look at the situation in South Vietnam. It is somewhat puzzling to me that the terms "hard line" and "soft line" seem to be reversed when we get over to the other side of the world. Those who discount the present and offer only hopes for the future are considered "hard" whereas those who look at the actual situation and point to the present map of Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam are accused of following a "soft line."

So far as I am concerned, it is both hard—in the sense of being difficult—and hardheaded—in the sense of being realistic—to admit honestly to ourselves what the facts are in Vietnam.

We are not winning in South Vietnam. We are backing a Government there that is incapable either of winning a military struggle or governing its people. We are fighting a determined army of guerrillas that seems to enjoy the cooperation of the countryside and that grows stronger in the face of foreign intervention, whether it be from the Japanese, some 20 years ago, the French, in the 1940's and 1950's, or from the United States.

In this circumstance, expanding the American military involvement is an act of folly designed in the end to create simply a larger, more inglorious debacle.

For nearly a quarter of a century, southeast Asia has been torn by military

and political conflict. First was the Japanese invasion of World War II. Then came nearly a decade of struggle with the French, culminating in the collapse of the French Army at Dienbienphu in 1954.

The French lost the cream of their army—a force which reached 400,000 men—in an unsuccessful effort to reestablish French control over Indochina. U.S. aid to the tune of \$2 billion financed 80 percent of the French war effort.

Then came the gradually deepening American involvement in southeast Asia in the 10 years after 1954 following defeat of the French.

American expenditures in Vietnam in addition to \$2 billion in aid to the French, now approach \$4 billion and, according to Defense Department figures, 248, and perhaps a total of over 300 Americans have died since 1964 trying to counsel and assist the Vietnamese forces.

It should be recognized, in the interest of truth, that, unlike the Japanese, who came to conquer southeast Asia, and the French, who set out to reestablish colonial control, we seek neither conquest nor colonies.

Yet we are further away from victory over the guerrilla forces in Vietnam today than we were a decade ago. The recent confrontation of the Vietcong Communist guerrillas and the South Vietnamese Army at Binh Gia was a painful, dramatic demonstration that the struggle is going badly for our side. Government prestige was hurt seriously in that battle. Communist stock has gone up. Concerned Americans are asking, "What has gone wrong?" and it seems a fair question.

In my judgment, the first answer is that South Vietnam is not basically a military problem but a political one. Neither the Diem regime nor its successors has won the political loyalty and active support of the people of South Vietnam, especially those who live outside town and city limits.

There are rarely military answers to political dilemmas of this nature. Just as the multilateral force plan in Europe—a military gimmick designed to create closer political unity in nuclear policy—has not achieved its objective—in the last few days the Turks have announced their withdrawal from participation in any such scheme—so military proposals in South Vietnam, whether for special forces, strategic hamlets, insurgency programs, or more suitably designed airplanes are not likely to overcome the political weaknesses of the existing South Vietnamese Government. Even the sophisticated weapons of the nuclear age cannot overrule the basic precepts of successful government.

This is a political problem, and it is a South Vietnamese problem. The United States can accomplish much through foreign aid and military support, but we cannot create strong, effective and popular national leadership where that leadership either does not exist or does not exert itself. That is not only expensive and impractical, it is just plain impossible.

For 9 years the United States helped the Diem government, to the tune of \$3 billion.

I will not chronicle in detail the years of Diem's rule, the achievement of some measure of economic stability, but the increasing political disaffection. That disaffection was encouraged, of course, by North Vietnam but basically Diem's own arbitrary rule made possible Vietcong gains. The very fact that Vietcong strength was and still is greatest in the Mekong Delta and around Saigon—more than a thousand miles away from North Vietnam—indicates that there is basic popular support for the guerrillas among the South Vietnamese peasants.

It is not isolationism, either of the old variety or the new, to recognize that U.S. advisers, however able, are simply no substitute for a competent and popular indigenous government. It is not idealism either; it is simply realism.

Only the Vietnamese themselves can provide the leaders and the sustained support to defeat the Vietcong. The United States can at most only hold a finger in the dike until the South Vietnamese find themselves.

Therefore, even at this 11th hour, when there is mounting pressure to increase U.S. troops in South Vietnam and step up aid policies, we must be hardheaded realists.

Americans in Asia are basically aliens, of a different race, religion and culture. Moreover, the Vietnamese are nationalistic and race-conscious in their outlook. As one on-the-scene observer pointed out, "If you imagine a Chinese sheriff speaking Cantonese and trying to keep order in Tombstone, Ariz., in its heyday, you will begin to get the problem."

More Americans, over and above the 25,000 now in South Vietnam, would not mean more success because victory in the Vietnam countryside depends on accurate intelligence information, peasant support and quick action by Vietnamese troops. These factors cannot be controlled by Americans. They must depend on the South Vietnamese. We must recognize that fact.

I recently spent a long and interesting evening with an astute observer of the Vietnam struggle who argued that victory is possible with a proper military formula. American military advisers in South Vietnam, he said, are highly able men who know how to win a guerrilla war. They have tried without success to persuade the South Vietnamese army to engage in night patrols against the Vietcong. They have urged small, fast moving units to attack the enemy directly with small arms rather than relying so heavily on artillery, airpower and large, cumbersome forces. But, said my friend, the South Vietnamese leaders and military forces will not accept this formula for victory.

Granted that my friend's analysis may be correct, this is still basically a political problem. If we are unable to persuade the Vietnamese to take either the military or nonmilitary steps necessary to insure the defeat of the Vietcong, we are indeed confronted by a dilemma that will not respond to larger imports of arms and advisers.

The more Americans are brought in to do what should be the responsibility of the Vietnamese Government, the greater

one can predict, will be the tendency of the Government to rely on U.S. advisers rather than on able Vietnamese, the greater will be the prestige of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese for holding at bay not merely their own countrymen but also the gathered might of the United States and, finally, the greater will be the grassroots reaction against Americans. In theory, our Government has recognized that the South Vietnamese bear primary responsibility for the war and civilian policies. In practice, Americans have assumed roles of increasing influence and leadership with slight military gains but disturbing deterioration on the local political level.

Personally, I am very much opposed to the policy, now gaining support in Washington, of extending the war to the North. I am disturbed by the recent reports of American air strikes in Laos and North Vietnam.

Attacks on North Vietnam will not seriously weaken guerrilla fighters a thousand miles away, fighters who depend for 80 percent of their weapons on captured U.S. equipment and for food on a sympathetic local peasantry. The principal foe is not the limited industrial capacity of North Vietnam, nor the North Vietnamese who have remained at home, and have not become involved in the conflict in the south, nor even their training camps and trails. The target is the 30,000 individual guerrilla fighters from North and South who have no trouble, apparently, finding sanctuary within South Vietnam or the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia. Bombing North Vietnam is not calculated to reduce their determination, but undoubtedly it would antagonize many other Asians and could easily lead to increased Red Chinese involvement in the whole Indochinese peninsula.

We might easily be confronted by the large and well-trained forces of North Vietnam, and perhaps the legions of Red China that took such a heavy toll of lives in the Korean conflict.

The present strength of the North Vietnamese army, an army that is thus far not involved in the conflict in the south, is twice that of the Japanese forces which overran all of southeast Asia during World War II. These are tough, disciplined fighters—tough divisions which defeated the large veteran French army at Dien Bien Phu over 10 years ago.

So, Mr. President, it seems to me that the most practical way, if we are to take further action in Vietnam, is to put pressure on North Vietnam quietly through infiltration and subversion by South Vietnamese units. The aim of any such infiltration should not be military victory, but bringing Ho Chi Minh to the negotiating table.

The most viable and practical policy for the United States in Vietnam is negotiation and a political settlement. Until such time as negotiation is possible and settlement can be devised which will not surrender South Vietnam to communism, the United States would doubtless not find it feasible or desirable to withdraw. If necessary, we can maintain our military position in Vietnam indefinitely, since it is essentially a policy of holding

the cities while taking whatever attrition is possible of the guerrillas in the countryside. But the aim of that policy must be seen as a prelude to diplomatic settlement and not an occasion for war against North Vietnam, or even worse, against Red China, with all the dangers that holds for our own security and for the peace of the world.

There are many ways to approach such a diplomatic settlement. Last August, during the Bay of Tonkin crisis, I suggested that we might take up French President de Gaulle's proposal for a 14-nation conference, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, Malaya, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Canada, Poland, India, and North and South Vietnam. More recently, the noted columnist, Walter Lippmann, raised the possibility of a Congress of Asia, dealing not only with Vietnam, but also with other problems relating to the stability and progress of Asia. The groundwork for any such gathering would have to be carefully laid, of course. Therefore, for the present, it would seem that the first step should probably be informal approaches to the interested nations and preliminary private talks. It is my understanding that it was in some such fashion that the conference of 1954 was created.

What are the objectives or terms on which we might be willing to put an end to fighting in South Vietnam? If military victory is impossible—and I am not talking about the stalemate in which we are presently involved, that we could probably continue for some time to come—but if a clear-cut military victory is impossible, we can only settle on the kind of terms that would be generally acceptable to ourselves to North Vietnam, and to other countries which have an interest in this area. We cannot simply walk out and permit the Vietcong to march into Saigon.

The minimum terms which might be acceptable on both sides would probably include:

First. Closer association or confederation between North and South Vietnam, not under a unitary Communist government from the North, but with local autonomy for the South as well as the North.

Second. Renewed trade and rail links between North and South Vietnam, which admittedly would be most useful to the North where there is a pressing need for the food grown in South Vietnam.

Third. Cooperative planning to benefit North and South Vietnam from the Mekong River development. For the South, it would mean primarily flood control. For the North, now outside of this promising Mekong watershed, it could mean valuable hydroelectric power for the industrial sector of the North.

Fourth. Neutralization of North and South Vietnam, meaning specifically guarantees that foreign troops and military advisers would gradually be eliminated as the situation permits.

Although this is a key point, it would not by any means eliminate all U.S. military forces from Asia nor would it bar AID and other civilian advisers. At the same time it would represent some

protection to North Vietnam from the North as well as the South, which should be attractive to them.

Fifth. Establishment of a United Nations presence or unit in southeast Asia with the right to enter every country in the area to guarantee national borders, to offer protection against external aggression, and insofar as possible to insure fair treatment of tribal and other minority groups within the boundaries of a given state.

Would such terms be acceptable to North Vietnam? Why, someone might ask, should Ho Chi Minh settle for even half a loaf if he sees the prospect for ultimate victory or thinks the United States might soon be ready to pull out, if he resists any efforts at all toward a negotiated settlement?

Actually, North Vietnam cannot benefit, any more than South Vietnam, from a prolonged conflict. I would hope that we would be prepared to wage such a conflict rather than to surrender the area to communism. The north has much to fear from any spread of the war, even subversion or infiltration. The North Vietnamese know very well what happened to the people and resources of North Korea during that war. Even though the fighting was not on their territory, neither was the subsequent U.S. assistance which helped rebuild the war torn areas in the south. The economic burden was devastating both in North Korea and in North Vietnam.

Moreover, although Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is closely allied to Red China in what probably amounts to a marriage of convenience, the Vietnamese have for centuries regarded the Chinese with suspicion and even outright hostility and strong resistance.

Obviously, Peiping's desire to exert control over Indochina runs directly contrary to all Vietnamese ambitions.

Escalation of the war by the United States, on the other hand, would make North Vietnam increasingly dependent on Red China and would strengthen, not Ho Chi Minh's influence, but, rather, would strengthen the influence of Mao Tse-tung in southeast Asia.

In fact, apart from Red China, no nation, North Vietnam included, has anything to gain from a long drawn out and inconclusive struggle in Vietnam. Only Red China gains from continuing the present confusion and weakness in Vietnam. Only Red China gains, in time and resources, so that it will be better able at some future time to exert its influence in southeast Asia.

France, for example, with considerable property and economic investment in North Vietnam, is eager for peace, putting economic stability ahead of almost any political consideration.

Great Britain, with a conflict looming between Malaysia and Indonesia, has never really endorsed U.S. policies in South Vietnam.

Even the Soviet Union can be expected to give quiet support to policies designed to prevent expansion of fighting and to reduce Peiping's influence in southeast Asia. New links both economic and diplomatic, between Moscow and Hanoi in North Vietnam are now being forged.

Moscow's influence could well be thrown, as it was in 1954, at the time the French left Vietnam, toward a negotiated settlement in southeast Asia.

The United States certainly is not anxious for broader commitments on the Asian mainland, but the key element in U.S. thinking is whether such a settlement would pave the way for Communist takeover in South Vietnam or elsewhere.

To that question, I recognize, there can be no simple answer, for the answer would depend on the abilities of the South Vietnamese to form a government with popular support and with the ability to cooperate in some fields with the North Vietnamese without losing their own independence.

To be realistic, any settlement in the foreseeable future will have to replace the present hostility between the North and the South, with greater economic cooperation and more political acceptance.

The policies and directions that Vietnam takes will depend on the character of the leadership from Saigon as well as Hanoi. The United States can help that leadership in a number of ways, but in this nationalistic day and age, the United States cannot offer American leadership or American soldiers as a substitute for popular and effective government from Saigon.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM WORSENS STEADILY—IT IS HIGH TIME THAT WE WAGED PEACE

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, since I first spoke in this Chamber on March 10, 1964, analyzing in detail the U.S. position in South Vietnam, the situation there and our position there has steadily deteriorated.

I said at that time, as I said repeatedly since that time and as I repeat now, the United States should take the most honorable route and employ the most effective means from the standpoint of U.S. prestige to disengage ourselves from our unilateral military foray in South Vietnam and withdraw our so-called advisory but actually combat troops there. But, in any event, get out we should and must, and stop both our killing and the killing of our American boys.

In my speech on March 10, 1964—10 months ago almost to the day—I pointed out:

President Johnson, let me repeat, inherited this mess. It was not of his making. As he approaches the difficult task of making the necessarily hard decisions with respect to the problems in South Vietnam, problems created long before he was President, he should feel no compunction to act in such a way as to justify past actions, past decisions and past mistakes. He should feel entirely free to act in such a manner and to make such decisions as are calculated best to serve the interests of the United States and the free world—a world changed greatly from the time President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles initiated our southeast Asia policies.

From March 10, 1964, until the close of the 2d session of the 88th Congress, I repeated my admonitions on the floor of the Senate with respect to our steadily deteriorating legal, military, and moral position in South Vietnam.

I pointed out that we were "going it alone" there with our SEATO allies conspicuous by their absence. I pointed out repeatedly that Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom had no fighting forces in South Vietnam—as we had—as thinly disguised "advisers." I emphasized the fact that many of our growing number of so-called advisers were right in the thick of battle fighting and being wounded and being killed in unfortunately growing numbers.

I have stated repeatedly that the legal position of the United States supporting our being in South Vietnam lacked substance and foundation. Our claim has been that we are in South Vietnam at the behest of the legally constituted Government of South Vietnam, irrespective of the fact that that Government has owed its continued existence on U.S. support and despite the fact that we have been actively taking sides in what is in reality a civil war. Of course, events of the last few weeks raise serious doubts as to whether we are actually in South Vietnam with our arms and military equipment at the invitation of the duly constituted Government of South Vietnam since we cannot tell, from day to day and from hour to hour who or what is the duly constituted legal Government of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact we now seem to be engaged in heated discussions controverting the claims of highly placed Vietnamese as to what constitutes their legal government. In fact we seem unable to get along with the various governments that we help install despite lavish aid and blandishments.

I have repeatedly referred to our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to bring the South Vietnamese situation to the attention of that body. Thus I stated:

There are ways to a peaceful solution in Vietnam and in all southeast Asia if we would but pursue them.

Last fall, when there was before this body a broad, blank check resolution on the crisis in southeast Asia, I voted against that resolution, explaining my position, in part, in the following words:

By long established practice, the Executive conducts the Nation's foreign policy. But the Congress and particularly, by constitutional mandate, the Senate has a right and duty in these premises to "advise and consent." Especially is this true when it is specifically called upon by the Executive as is the case now, for its participation in momentous decisions of foreign policy. Therefore we in the Senate would be derelict in our duty if we did not individually express our views if those views embody doubt or dissent, and where a vote is called for, to cast that vote as our conscience directs.

As early as March 10, nearly 5 months ago, I took the floor and in an address of considerable length urged that the United States get out of South Vietnam, at least to the extent of participation by our soldiery. Since that time, I have discussed U.S. participation in this area of the world repeatedly. I have stated and restated my view that this was not our war; that we were wholly misguided in picking up the burden abandoned by France 10 years ago after the French had suffered staggering losses running into tens of thousands of French young lives and vast

sums of money to which the United States contributed heavily, and thereupon entering upon a policy which would be bound to result, as it has resulted, in the sacrificing of the lives of our young Americans in an area, and in a cause that in my reasoned judgment poses no threat to our national security.

Mr. President, since the Congress approved the southeast Asia resolution, the situation in South Vietnam has gone not only from bad to worse, but from worse to still worse.

In an excellent summary of the present "Shameful Mess" in South Vietnam, Richard Starnes, writing in the Washington Daily News on January 4, 1965, states:

There are, sadly, times when such terrible risks must be taken. The Cuban missile crisis was one such time, for it threatened the very existence of the American Nation.

No such threat exists in South Vietnam. The fact that the Vietcong are Communists does not make the war any less a civil war. Talk that we are fighting to keep a foothold on the Asian mainland makes no more sense than the Soviet gibberish that it was installing defensive missiles in Cuba. It is equally indefensible.

American interests in the Western Pacific can be handsomely garrisoned on Okinawa, the Philippines, and South Korea. There is no more military rationale for risking war over South Vietnam than there is moral or legal justification.

President Johnson needs to remind himself of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too important a concern to be left in the hands of generals, and he needs to find the courage and statescraft to extricate us from the shameful mess we are in in southeast Asia.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article by Mr. Starnes be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McNAMARA in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, our strained situation in South Vietnam causes us to assume a strained posture with respect to our allies and to make requests of them which are not to their advantage and which will ultimately prove to be to our disadvantage.

Those able political observers and commentators, Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, writing in the Anchorage Daily Times on January 2, 1965, report:

At least five Latin American countries are being strongly urged by the United States to send token military or economic units to strife-lacerated South Vietnam.

The article goes on to name the countries being strongly urged by the United States to send military or economic aid to South Vietnam as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

That list is obviously incomplete, since earlier this week I read where Uruguay was sending a token force to South Vietnam, so obviously that country had also been strongly urged by the United States to show the flag in South Vietnam.

Yesterday's Washington News carried a report that Argentina, at the request of the United States has agreed to send a medical team, medicine, sanitary equipment, and food to South Vietnam. It should be noted that the report specifically states that this contribution was made at the request of the Government

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of the United States not the Government of South Vietnam, whatever that may be.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire column by Allen and Scott be printed at the conclusion of my remarks, since what they report is highly significant.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McNAMARA in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in the first place it should be noted that they report that it was the Government of the United States and not the Government of South Vietnam that was "strongly urging" our Latin American neighbors to send the flag to South Vietnam. It is difficult to understand the legal right which the United States professes to exercise in extending an invitation to the Latin American countries to join us in the fighting in South Vietnam. Even the fact that the U.S. representatives in South Vietnam could not determine which was the legally constituted Government in South Vietnam when it was determined to approach the Latin American countries does not clothe us with any legal right to extend such an invitation, unless we are publicly proclaiming that the United States is in fact the Government of South Vietnam.

We should at least have kept up the pretense and made certain that the invitation to the Latin American countries to participate in the civil war in South Vietnam was issued in the name of the Government of South Vietnam.

In the second place, the pressures exerted by the United States on our partners in the Alliance for Progress will seriously retard the Alliance and will cast doubt upon its very objectives.

Our neighbors to the south need to devote all their energies and resources to their economic development. They have a long way to go in correcting the social and economic inequalities with which they are beset. Our efforts should be devoted to convincing them that they should begrudge every single dollar spent in their military budgets since such expenditures are economically unproductive. We should not be encouraging them to spend additional funds in the empty gesture of "showing the flag" in a war not of their concern waged thousands of miles away. Such activities are counterproductive even if the United States offers to pay the cost of such a "token" show of force. The money could better be spent on the construction of a new school or a new clinic, both of which are sorely needed in every country.

There is much which we must expect our partners in the Alliance for Progress to do to aid in their economic development. We cannot and should not add to the burden of the obligations which they must assume by calling upon them, in however small a way, to engage in extraneous and unnecessary military activities.

In his state of the Union message, President Johnson pledged that he would "steadily enlarge our commitment to the Alliance for Progress as the instrument of our war against poverty and injustice in the hemisphere." It is difficult for me

to see how embroiling our partners under the Alliance can in any way further our commitment to help them wage war against "poverty and injustice in the hemisphere."

But, Mr. President, we are dealing in South Vietnam with more than U.S. dollars and U.S. military equipment. The war in Vietnam is costing the United States dearly in killed and wounded American military men, for, despite whatever labels may be attached to them, they are in the frontlines fighting the Vietcong.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Saigon appearing in the January 6, 1965, Washington Star:

The United States suffered nearly twice as many battle casualties in South Vietnam in 1964 as in the 3 previous years combined, official sources announced today.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire item as it appeared in the paper be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARTKE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, translated into concrete figures, in the 3-year period from 1961 through 1963, 107 American servicemen were killed in the war in South Vietnam. In the last year alone, more men were killed—136—than in the previous 3 years. The ratio for men injured last year was even worse. In the 3 previous years, 615 men were injured. Last year, 1,037 American fighting men were injured.

It is extremely unfortunate when a single American military man is killed in the steamy jungles of South Vietnam fighting in a civil war for a people most reluctant to fight in a cause which cannot be settled by arms, but can only be settled politically, and cannot in any event be settled by the United States acting unilaterally.

But to suffer almost 1,800 casualties there is a national disgrace.

Even worse, the killings and the woundings continue almost daily. To what end?

Consider the lives that would have been saved and the number of men who could have been saved from battle wounds if the advice I have given over the past several months had been heeded and the South Vietnam mess had been taken to the conference table.

In his state of the Union message, President Johnson—explaining why we are fighting South Vietnam—stated:

We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it.

I will not at this point discuss this interpretation of the pledge given 10 years ago or the implications of our being put in a position of agreeing to fight communism at the time and on the battlefield of their choosing anywhere in the world.

I will say that there is nothing inconsistent with this pledge—even as interpreted by President Johnson—and the course of action I have strongly advocated of taking the conflict in South

Vietnam to the conference table. Even if our pledge of assistance to South Vietnam is interpreted as meaning that we agreed to send our fighting men to die in South Vietnam, even if we overlook the fact that the conflict is a civil war, nevertheless our pledge cannot and must not be interpreted as meaning that we agreed to continue a futile military effort until the United States had conquered South Vietnam and the last Vietcong had been wiped out.

We can keep our pledge to South Vietnam by seeking to bring peace to that beleaguered country via the conference route as well as by force of arms. This we should do without delay. I can well see the U.S. military forces taking part in peacekeeping efforts in South Vietnam under the aegis of the United Nations. That is the only way American men and American arms should be used there.

Since I first spoke out on this issue, my mail has been exceedingly heavy on this subject. The astonishing thing is that this heavy mail is running well over 100 to 1 in favor of my stand. The mail has come from all over the United States and from people in all walks of life.

I ask unanimous consent that a sampling of these letters be printed at the conclusion of my remarks, together with certain selected articles and editorials from various newspapers and periodicals.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, earlier in my remarks, I quoted from an article by Richard Starnes, entitled "Shameful Mess," but I did not quote the first four paragraphs which now have assumed a new pertinence which they did not have when the article was printed 10 days ago.

The four paragraphs read:

The pretense of legality cloaking American intervention in southeast Asia grows more threadbare with every passing hour.

U.S. aircraft are preparing to launch strikes against parts of the misnamed Ho Chi Minh Trail that cross Laos, in clear violation of the Geneva accord of 1962, which we signed.

The 1962 pact, which undertook to neutralize Laos, prohibits introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations, and foreign military personnel into Laos.

Our excuse for this calculated violation of a solemn covenant is that North Vietnam violated it first. Even if this is true, it reveals a corrosive cynicism on the part of the one nation on earth that has always preached the rule of law in international affairs.

Mr. President, the disastrous consequences of the escalation of the war, which is only now revealed to the American people because of the loss of our jet planes, as well as its futility, is further discussed in another article by Richard Starnes in the Washington News of January 15, entitled "Raising the Ante." I ask unanimous consent that it be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RAISING THE ANTE

(By Richard Starnes)

Whatever else may be said about the U.S. twilight war in Laos, it needs to be pointed

out that it has conspicuously failed to fulfill its announced mission.

Bombing of Communist supply trails and depots in Laos was proposed (proposed after it was already underway, as it turns out) as a means of stifling the flow of arms to the Vietcong. This in turn was to reduce their ability to fight, and thus make them receptive to some species of negotiated settlement.

It has been revealed now that raids against Vietcong supply lines have been in progress since June. There has been no diminution of the Communist guerilla war potential during that time. Indeed, even the eternally optimistic Pentagon line has been modified to admit now what every honest correspondent has known for 2 years—that the war is going very badly indeed for our side.

As a consequence it is not even possible to argue that this extension of war in southeast Asia has the virtue of success. Raids in Laos apparently have been on a small scale, but experience in Korea taught that even large-scale air bombardment did not significantly reduce the enemy's ability to supply his troops.

This was understood, of course, before the first sortie was flown. Why, then, take the risks inherent in extending the war? And why further mortgage American prestige by an act that is clearly in violation of the 1962 Geneva accord on the neutralization of Laos, which the United States and 13 other nations signed? The agreement spells out a clear prohibition against warlike acts based in or carried out against Laos, and we are in clear violation of it.

The argument cannot be advanced that we have had to meet new aggression; the Laos supply routes were in use in 1962, when we signed, just as they are now. The only thing that has changed is the United States willingness to honor a solemn covenant.

The reason for this extraordinary—and extraordinarily dangerous—move is not hard to find. It is a manifestation of the growing mood of frustration in the Nation's \$50 billion a year Defense Establishment. We cannot endure the knowledge that our costly war machine may be defeated by barefooted irregulars. We will, in the phase currently favor in the Pentagon, raise the ante. Make it tough and expensive enough, this reasoning goes, and the enemy will quit.

Unfortunately for our side, the lessons of history do not support this rationale any more than they support the efficacy of aerial interdiction of supply. We made it expensive in Korea, and the enemy saw our raise. It appears that half a year of raising the ante in Laos has had the same effect, since it has been half a year of almost unbroken Vietcong successes.

The trouble with raising the ante, to continue the poker analogy, is that the game stands in serious danger of turning into table stakes—that is, the players bet everything they can lay hand to. What is our response to be 6 months hence when it becomes clear that we have been called and we will have raised again or get out of the game?

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I hope that President Johnson and his advisers will read these paragraphs, take them to heart and move, instead of in the direction of escalating or even maintaining the war, in the direction of all-out effort to promote peace by negotiating. Why not enlist the United Nations?

We have not yet made that effort. We have not tried to take the matter to the conference table. We have not used the provisions in the United Nations Charter which spell out clearly half a dozen methods which are the legal and moral obligation of the signatories of that charter. It is high time that we use

them and stop the killing of Vietnamese men, women, and children and of American boys.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Daily News, Jan. 4, 1965]

SHAMEFUL MESS

(By Richard Starnes)

The pretense of legality cloaking American intervention in southeast Asia grows more threadbare with every passing hour.

U.S. aircraft are preparing to launch strikes against parts of the misnamed Ho Chi Minh Trail that cross Laos, in clear violation of the Geneva accord of 1962, which we signed.

The 1962 pact, which undertook to neutralize Laos, prohibits introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations, and foreign military personnel into Laos.

Our excuse for this calculated violation of a solemn covenant is that North Vietnam violated it first. Even if this is true, it reveals a corrosive cynicism on the part of the one nation on earth that has always preached the rule of law in international affairs.

Leaving for the moment the moral and legal character of our resolve to enlarge the war, we find that the more practical aspects of the decision are no more durable. The theory (which even our most ardent war hawks cannot really believe) is that bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail will somehow persuade North Vietnam and Communist China to withdraw support from the Vietcong insurgency that is winning South Vietnam.

There are three tragically dangerous fallacies involved here—fallacies that could cost a great many young American lives.

Fallacy No. 1: That any amount of bombing (short of laying a massive radioactive carpet across the waist of the peninsula) would be effective. Korea proved that no amount of conventional bombing could diminish the enemy's ability to supply his troops. There is, moreover, not one shred of credible evidence that the bulk of munitions used by the Vietcong originate in the north. At the outset, the Vietcong used crude homemade weapons, but the bulk of their arms now are captured or otherwise acquired from the woefully inept defenders of South Vietnam.

Fallacy No. 2: On no evidence at all, the proponents of escalation insist that this demonstration of Western armed power would create an atmosphere in which negotiations for peace could be undertaken from a position of strength. This reasoning simply won't float, for it assumes that North Vietnam and Red China would be willing to do what we ourselves are so unwilling to do—that is, negotiate from a position of weakness.

Underlying all else is fallacy No. 3: That the insurgency in South Vietnam is primarily an external war of aggression. Again, there is no real evidence of this. The war is nurtured and encouraged by North Vietnam, to be sure, but there is no assurance that Hanoi could stop the war even if it so willed.

In Korea we hypnotized ourselves into believing that Communist China would not enter the war. We are now in the process of repeating this catastrophic piece of self-deception. On past performance, Red China is calculated to respond in kind if the United States falls into the trap of stepping up the war in southeast Asia. It is a mistake to assume that this would simply result in another Korea. It would result in something infinitely worse, for we are now dealing with a Communist China that has the bomb.

Thus the smallest increment in the war contains the frightful seeds of nuclear holocaust.

There are, sadly, times when such terrible risks must be taken. The Cuban missile

crisis was one such time, for it threatened the very existence of the American Nation.

No such threat exists in South Vietnam. The fact that the Vietcong are Communists does not make the war any less a civil war. Talk that we are fighting to keep a foothold on the Asian mainland makes no more sense than the Soviet gibberish that it was installing defensive missiles in Cuba. It is equally indefensible.

American interests in the western Pacific can be handsomely garrisoned from Okinawa, the Philippines, and South Korea. There is no more military rationale for risking war over South Vietnam than there is moral or legal justification.

President Johnson needs to remind himself of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too important a concern to be left in the hands of generals, and he needs to find the courage and statecraft to extricate us from the shameful mess we are in in southeast Asia.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the Anchorage Daily Times, Jan. 2, 1965]

SOUTH VIETNAM PUZZLE

(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)

WASHINGTON.—At least five Latin American countries are being strongly urged by the United States to send token military or economic units to strife-lacerated South Vietnam.

They are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

Other South American nations reputedly are under similar backstage pressure, but this has not yet been positively established.

The five definitely known to be importuned are among the leading beneficiaries of U.S. aid. Latest available official figures show that since 1946 they have received the following huge totals:

Brazil, more than \$2.25 billion. This does not include \$1 billion in new credits the United States took the lead in arranging last month, with several other NATO countries, to enable the reform regime of President Humberto Branco to combat soaring inflation and other grave economic disorders.

Chile, upwards of \$850 million, with new large-scale aid proposals pending.

Colombia, more than \$550 million, with additional grants and loans under consideration.

Peru, upwards of \$500 million, and like the others seeking more funds.

Venezuela, around \$350 million, of which more than \$317 million has been in loans and only \$18 million in outright grants. Since 1962 this oil-rich nation has received less than \$10 million in U.S. aid.

All these countries are markedly cool to getting involved in the increasingly chaotic and unpredictable South Vietnam conflict.

They are displaying distinct reluctance to dispatching even token forces, such as medical or logistic units, or teachers, agricultural experts, and technicians—as the State Department has pointedly "suggested."

Various objections are being raised, foremost among them lack of funds to meet the considerable cost of "showing the flag" in distant southeast Asia.

The United States countered by offering to foot the bill.

Presumably that would include financing transportation, pay, maintenance, and other charges.

These urgent backstage exhortations and proposals are in striking contrast to the administration's cold shouldering of offers from three U.S. allies in the Far East to send thousands of combat troops to South Vietnam.

South Korea, National China, and the Philippines expressed readiness to send some 50,000 fully equipped and trained fighting men.

In each instance, they were turned down.

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The official explanation was that employment of these Asian battle forces would seriously risk escalating the conflict into a major war. Secretary Rusk asked the three allies to dispatch instead noncombat elements, such as medical and logistic units.

All three have complied.

Another baffling South Vietnam enigma is the role of Thrich Tri Quang, leading Buddhist who was given refuge in the U.S. Embassy in the 1963 struggle with the late President Ngo Dinh Diem.

U.S. Intelligence has flatly tagged Quang as an agent of Communist North Vietnam acting on instructions from the Hanoi regime.

Yet Quang is a key adviser of both Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh and Buddhist members of the civilian council that was abolished by the so-called young turk generals with Khanh's backing.

Quang also has been consulted by Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on establishing a stable government in Saigon.

Early last fall former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge visited a number of NATO capitals seeking assistance for South Vietnam. He undertook this mission as the personal emissary of President Johnson.

Lodge's results were virtually nil.

None of the European allies offered any personnel. The only contribution was a small amount of economic aid from the Erhard regime in West Germany.

In the Washington diplomatic corps, one explanation being discussed for the administration's apparent strong desire for Latin American representation in South Vietnam is to broaden the Western base in preparation for shifting this tortuous problem to the United Nations.

Such a move, it is pointed out, could be the prelude to negotiations to naturalize not only South Vietnam, but Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand under "U.N. guarantees."

Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Averall Harriman reputedly favor such a solution of the whole southeast Asian problem.

Rusk is credited as having discussed this with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in their series of Washington and New York talks last month. Rusk is said to have stressed the administration is willing to agree to coalition governments in these countries in which Communists would participate.

Also to allow Soviet economic missions and advisers to operate in these countries.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 6, 1965]

U.S. CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM RISE

SAIGON.—The United States suffered nearly twice as many battle casualties in South Vietnam in 1964 as in the three previous years combined, official sources announced today.

A total of 1,173 U.S. battle casualties were reported for 1964, including 136 killed. The combined figure for 1961, 1962, and 1963 was 615 casualties, including 107 killed.

During the last year, the U.S. Army suffered 1,009 casualties, the Navy 25, the Marine Corps 39 and the Air Force 100.

Fourteen American servicemen were listed as missing in action for 1964.

EXHIBIT 4

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
Ithaca, N.Y., August 9, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please accept my sincere congratulations and my strong support for your vote against the southeast Asia resolution.

I am not at all sure that the interests of our country are best served by our being

involved in Vietnam. Your vote, expressing some serious doubts about this entire military enterprise, was extremely heartening. What is it that makes so many of the denizens of Capitol Hill so bellicose? Nowadays I find myself worrying less about the military and more about the military-minded civilians—who rattle their paper sabers with such frightening displays of toughness. I am fully persuaded that it takes a lot more courage not to be "tough" nowadays.

Your vote represented more than your Alaska constituents last week.

Sincerely yours,

ANDREW HACKER,
Associate Professor.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing this letter to you to commend you on your thoughtful and sensible comments on the threatening situation in southeast Asia.

Though extremists may criticize your point of view, time will prove that your recommendations for a peaceful solution are the only course to follow if mankind is to survive.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER BRIEHL, M.D.,
Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, U.S.
Army Air Force (Inactive).

BERKELEY, CALIF.,
August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Applaud courage and good sense in position against Vietnam resolution.

Mr. and Mrs. WILLIAM PITT,
Department of Mathematics,
University of California.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
August 8, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Although I am not one of your constituents, I would like to commend you for your courageous stand in voting against the recent resolution on Vietnam. I am not a pacifist (absolute style, I mean) nor am I a Communist sympathizer. But everything I read (e.g., your fine article in Fact) leads me to conclude that we are acting stupidly and dangerously over there.

Cordially,

PAUL E. MEEHL.

Same to Senator MORSE.

WILLAMINA, OREG.,
November 28, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We were glad to receive your reply and learn that you received many letters in support of your opposition to our policy in Vietnam.

I do not know when this will reach you or if you will be in a position to act upon it when it does, but in any case I feel I must write. The point is that with Maxwell Taylor in Washington, D.C., and conferences scheduled, it would seem that in all probability important decisions will be made this week concerning our war in Vietnam. If there is anything you can do to influence our turning the whole thing over to the U.N., I am writing to urge you to do so.

Respectfully yours,

FRITZ MISHLER.

TACOMA, WASH.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Keep up the fight on double standard of assistance. I hope the new Congress heeds your advice and cuts most of this foolish foreign aid.

As for the Vietnam war, I'm totally on your side. I think we have no business there at

all especially losing American lives. I agree with you completely that the Vietnam affair is an internal affair of that nation. Let the Communist have it, and let us use the funds wasted there to rebuild and develop Alaska, further education throughout the United States, and the other so much more worthy and necessary causes—checking mental retardation, juvenile delinquency, etc.

ANDREW WM. VACHON, S.J.

DULUTH, MINN.

DEAR SIR: I understand you voted against the recent Vietnam resolution. Thank you. I agree that it's not worth our lives and money.

J. STEPHENS.

AUGUST 19, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to commend you for your lonely struggle against the horrors and imbecilities of America's current military program in Vietnam. It is indeed a lamentable fact that men in your position must deal with a public opinion that, for the most part, is dreadfully mal-, mis-, and downright un-informed about the events and issues in question. Following its present course, this American military program seems in exorably destined to result in another unfortunate (and eventually highly unpopular) war with China. If that should happen, your present stand will, of course, be vindicated and this same public opinion will (just as monolithically, no doubt) howl for an end to the slaughter. Even if you happen to be "wrong" in regard to Vietnam, and this does not appear to be the case, I salute you for your courage.

Very truly yours,

T. G. POWELL.

BROOKLINE, MASS.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to commend you for your good stand for the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. I have already written to the Senators and Congressmen from my State to use their influence for such withdrawal.

Yours truly,

CELIA BARAP.

SAN DIEGO, CALIF.,
August 12, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Although your vote against the President's plan for retaliatory action in Vietnam was in a pitiful, and to me strange, minority, you were, in a manner of speaking, voting for me, even though I be a Californian, and I am writing to thank you for that vote, and to assure you that there are many others who are not your constituents who are grateful to you for your stand.

Sincerely yours,

ZIKA HERZ.

ST. MATTHEW'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
Louisville, Ky., August 5, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I have just read your article in the recent issue of Fact magazine. It is one of the few stories about Vietnam which I have read which makes any sense to me.

Now we are having a flareup on account of attacks on our destroyers. It is inevitable that there should be such crises as this from time to time as long as we are messing around over in South Vietnam.

I am writing Senators COOPER and MORTON today to tell them that I, for one, am in

hearty agreement with the thoughts which you expressed.

Gratefully yours,

WILFRED MYLL.

BAYSIDE, N.Y.,

August 8, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I read in the New York Times that you were one of the two Senators voting against the joint resolution approving President Johnson's actions in the Vietnam crisis.

While the voice of wisdom is thus reduced to a small whisper, I believe, nevertheless, that it will be heard throughout the land. If, by some miracle, we are spared the dread horrors of universal atomic war, the credit should, in a large measure, go to you and Senator MORSE who have been consistent in counseling moderation.

Geographically, you are thousands of miles away from me and I will never be able to express my thanks for your refusal to be bulldozed into conformity by voting for your reelection. However, I am proud that in the Senate there are, even now in the time of hysteria, two men who think independently and vote according to their conscience. This, I am sure, is a good omen for our future and that of the world.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN STRAUSS.

MOUNT RAINIER, Md.,

August 13, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your courageous vote on the President's declaration concerning Vietnam is appreciated by every American citizen who is concerned with the moral basis of U.S. policy. Your action in this matter is what true patriotism is all about.

Sincerely,

MRS. MARIE G. ALI.

OAK PARK, ILL.,

August 11, 1964.

Senator GRUENING of Alaska,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to thank you and praise you for voting against President Johnson's resolution last Friday.

I have recently visited Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma and other spots in the Far East and Middle East and I feel very deeply that we are following a precarious and provocative course in that part of the world. It is tragic that a great Nation such as the United States of America could be so misled as to accept and approve such a resolution with only two dissenting votes. You should be proud to be one of the dissenters. I would like to join you.

May your reward be great as I am sure it will—if not in this life and time, in some future life.

Best wishes for your continued success and your good influence.

Sincerely,

HELEN R. LAUGHLIN.

THE WISCASSET INN,

Wiscasset, Maine, August 9, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is a short note to say bravo for your stand against gunboat diplomacy in southeast Asia.

May you win over many to your cause.

Sincerely,

FANNY VENTADOUR.

DENVER, COLO.,

August 11, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We wish to commend you for voting against supporting the President in the southeast Asia situation.

Your forthright stand on important issues is very much appreciated.

We are very much alarmed at the possibility of spreading nuclear weapons and urge you to do all possible to get a full debate in the Senate on a concurrent resolution disapproving the agreement to permit NATO countries to share nuclear information.

Sincerely yours,

MRS. DOROTHY JACOB.

MRS. ANN BEATTY.

MRS. ANNE R. ROBNETT.

MISS SONIA GINSBURG.

NORTH WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.,

May 7, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to let you know that I support your efforts to find a peaceful solution to the costly and unjust war in Vietnam. I urge you to use your influence to set up procedure for negotiations to enable the termination of U.S. military involvement.

Respectfully yours,

EVELYN MALKIN.

RADBURN, FAIR LAWN, N.J.,

August 7, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Good for you. That was a brave vote against warmaking power for President Johnson. I hope you keep on fighting against the dirty business in southeast Asia, which can result only in disaster for us. Honest history will vindicate you.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN ACKERSON.

BURLINGTON, VT.,

August 10, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: This is to express sympathy with your stand on Vietnam and admiration for your courage in opposing endorsement of the President's actions.

With every good wish.

Yours sincerely,

ROWENA P. ANSBACHER,
H. L. ANSBACHER.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please keep up your valiant opposition to further U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

With gratitude and respect,

LUCY P. CARNER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,

August 8, 1965.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to commend you for your courage in voting against the resolution giving war powers to the President in Vietnam.

I know it was not easy to go against the tide of hysteria on this issue, but I am glad you did, and I am sure that someday the historians will say you were right.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

DUANE MAGILL.

MARION, IOWA,

August 5, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I read your article on Vietnam in the July-August issue of Fact, and so glad you wrote it. Am so afraid this war will continue in the north of Vietnam and on into China. This dirty war

could easily get us into nuclear world war III.

Am sorry there is not more debate as to the advisability of continuing this war which was never declared.

Thanking you for the article.

Sincerely,

IRENE G. COONEBES.

PORTLAND, OREG.,

September 24, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for your stand on Vietnam, calling for negotiations instead of military force.

Sincerely,

MRS. MILDRED MONROE.

EMBARRASS, MINN.,

August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am glad to see that the gentleman from our newest State expressed reason and a value for human life in the vote on the resolution regarding the President's action in Vietnam.

One voice may no longer matter in affecting the policies of this country, but I wish you to know that I admire your courage, and support your stand.

Sincerely,

KAREN R. KIVELA.

AUGUST 10, 1964.

SENATOR GRUENING: We feel thankful for your stand against American aggression in Vietnam.

MICHAEL LURIE.

CANANDAIGUA, N.Y.,

July 28, 1964.

HON. SENATOR GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We commend the efforts you are making by speaking out against the consequences of our U.S. policy in Vietnam. We agree that there can be no winning of this kind war, and that there are terrible dangers from the possibility of its escalating into something that no one, including the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, would want, but might be forced into. The more weapons we send to Vietnam, the more we are outfitting the guerrillas; they seem to have captured so many of our modern weapons—in fact, seem to get few from other sources in comparison.

If you and others can put pressure on our Government to stop wasting our money in this fashion, and to make a big, sincere effort to influence other countries in finding some way to work toward neutralizing the area, we will find our prestige in the eyes of the underdeveloped countries but also Russia, France and others will be increased. And the South Vietnamese people will fight harder with us if they know there is a goal—a possibility of peace—before they are annihilated or decide to join the Communists.

Yours very sincerely,

MRS. WALTER GRUEN.

LANESBORO, MASS.,

August 8, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your forthright stand against the extension of the U.S. military involvement in southeast Asia has been repeatedly noted and appreciated in the last several years. I am indeed impressed by the simple clarity of your statements in this regard. You show an ability, all too rare these days, to rise about parties politics and sectional interests and even above selfish nationalism to see what is right. This is statesmanship and I commend you for it.

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We are waging a losing battle for a lost cause, even a wrong cause, in southeast Asia. I am heartsick that there are so few voices courageous enough to speak out against this latest form of economic imperialism—but proud indeed that there are these few.

Congratulations and thank you—you speak for many of us.

Respectfully yours,

Mrs. ROBERT M. POLLOCK.

HUBBARD WOODS, ILL.,
August 7, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your courageous stand. Would we had many more like you.

Sincerely,

ATLANTIS MARSHALL.

ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.,
July 27, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: Permit me to commend you for your forceful, forthright opposition to our part in the "dirty war" in South Vietnam. I, too, am opposed to our intervention in that country's internal affairs. It is bound to hurt our prestige in southeast Asia as well as in the United Nations. I have received documents regarding this matter from other Members in Congress. After reading them, I have passed them on to other voters in this area. I never throw anything in my wastepaper basket like that, and find that most Americans are glad to read about the war in South Vietnam. I hope that our Government will find ways to withdraw our Armed Forces from South Vietnam without losing too much "face." Thank you again for your opposition to the "dirty war" in South Vietnam. I hope your efforts will be successful, at least in educating the citizens of the United States. Good luck and best wishes to you.

I am,

Very truly yours,

EDWARD K. FIELD.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
May 23, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING: We fully support your stand on nonexpansion of the fighting in southeast Asia and particularly South Vietnam.

It now seems that the United States will soon commit itself to even more extensive military action in this area. Continued involvement can only lead to further unjustified killings of women and children, as in the recent attack on Cambodian villages. In such cases, the United States will always be blamed, regardless of how much control our advisers have of the situation. This distresses us very much.

We strongly urge and hope that you will speak out for the removal of U.S. advisers.

Now is the time to start building a lasting peace in this area—by such means as another Geneva conference or neutralization of the area—in which foreign powers (from both sides) will not dominate.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. PETER HUNT.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 9, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for your honesty and courage in taking a stand against extending the conflict in southeast Asia. I believe that a negotiated settlement of the issues is the only way to achieve a lasting peace.

Sincerely yours,

EDMOND S. HARRIS.

HAYWARD, CALIF.,
August 13, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HON. SENATOR GRUENING: We wish to let you know that we appreciate and support the statement you made concerning southeast Asia.

Our country has abrogated its agreement to the decisions made at the SEATO Conference in 1954 with its military involvement in Vietnam. We share with you the attitude that in order to preserve the peace, the problem must be handled around the conference table. Otherwise, we are in grave danger of igniting a worldwide nuclear war, and of course, the destruction of mankind.

We cannot let ourselves be guided only by the militarists.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. ALEX S. TRESKIN.

MADISON, WIS.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Just a note to affirm my support for your statements on South Vietnam. Keep it up, we cannot permit this war to continue.

Very truly yours,

RUSSELL JACOBY.

LIVINGSTON, N.J.,
August 15, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to congratulate you for the position that you took with reference to the President's order for the bombing of North Vietnam.

It is unfortunate that there are only two voices of moderation in Congress. The use of the United Nations is bypassed. Our Constitution is worthless and a hollow mockery. The incident smacks of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor and such conduct on our part makes the Japanese at Pearl Harbor look like Sunday school children.

If there is any way I can help, please let me know. Just as in pre-Hitlerite Germany, to hold an unpopular view which is against that painted in the press makes one suspect I am fearful for my country, my family, and myself.

Respectfully,

LEON M. MOSNER.

BURLINGTON, VT.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I commend you for your courageous stand against U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

DAVID S. MOE.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
January 5, 1965.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thank you for your unrelenting stand against the disastrous position which our country has taken in southeast Asia. Many stubbornly ignorant men oppose you. We are sure that you will keep on fighting interventionism in Asia, and must finally win, and we hope that it will be soon.

Very sincerely yours,

HELEN and ARTHUR BERTHOLF.

SAN ANSELMO, CALIF.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I want you to know that your statements on U.S. foreign policy, particularly Vietnam, are greatly appreciated. Men like you, holding a responsible office, who speak out for a more intelligent policy are very important in these dangerous times. Please keep the fight up.

Sincerely,

CLARE McKEAGE.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.,
August 11, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to express appreciation for your vote against the extension of operations in Vietnam. Our people are confused on what is taking place there and it is to be hoped that your courageous and realistic stand will win many adherents.

Sincerely,

GORDON H. GRAVES.

AMHERST, MASS.,
August 9, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I support your position on the Vietnam resolution, and I wish to express my respect for your willingness to stand almost alone in this serious matter.

I have had occasion to sit in on a few of the sessions of the World Assembly of Youth, now meeting here at the University of Massachusetts. Delegates and observers from over 100 countries are present. For the most part they are opposed to military action in Vietnam. They favor U.N. intervention and a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements, including withdrawal of foreign troops. I wish that our Senate might have had the opportunity, as I have had, to listen to articulate foreign opinion. And I wonder how much the ugly shadow of Goldwaterism may be already influencing U.S. foreign policy.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN A. ALLEN.

BRONX, N.Y.

Hon. Senator GRUENING,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Your declaration that "All Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American" has my 100 percent approval.

Although, being just a poor physician, I know what it means for a mother to bear a child.

Just keep on opposing and try your best to uphold peace.

May God bless you always.

Very cordially yours,

JOSEPH S. FERACA, M.D.

SAN ANSELMO, CALIF.

Senator GRUENING.

DEAR SIR: I support your stand and vote on Vietnam.

Keep it up.

Sincerely,

J. BUCHWALD.

BETHESDA, MD.,
August 7, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to express my thanks to you for your sensible and courageous stand on the Vietnam resolution.

Sincerely,

EDWIN A. WEINSTEIN.

ANCHORAGE, ALASKA,
September 20, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Our support and sincere respect goes with you on your stand on U.S. policy in southeast Asia.

Thank you for sending the very complete and informative CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 10 and August 7. The receipt of any future proceedings along this subject will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. C. S. SPARKS.

THE SOUTH PARK METHODIST CHURCH,
Hartford, Conn., December 29, 1964.
Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to express my support for a change in our Vietnam policy. I am glad to read in a recent New York Times story that you too feel that a change is in order.

Enclosed are two statements on Vietnam which I have recently distributed to our church members and to others. The response has been such as to convince me that the public would support an intelligent policy toward southeast Asia if such policy was forthrightly and persuasively presented.

Yours truly,

GEORGE G. HILL,
Minister.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to write this line of strong support and very real gratitude for your stand in regard to the war in South Vietnam.

I, too, am disturbed by the actions of the U.S. Government in the choice of the Ambassador to replace Lodge, the overflights and bombings in Laos by U.S. planes, and the statements of Secretary Dean Rusk.

More power to you.

Yours gratefully,
Rt. Rev. W. APPLETON LAWRENCE,
Retired Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Western Massachusetts.

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,
DEPARTMENT, MICHIGAN COLLEGE
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., August 3, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Please accept my strong and sincere support of your position taken on southeast Asia and Vietnam—on the floor of the Senate, in press interviews, and volume, I, issue 4, Fact, July–August 1964 issue.

Keep up the good work.

MILTON E. SCHERER.
P.S.—I'm a Demo too. Best.

SILVER SPRING, Md.,
August 7, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Wholeheartedly support your endeavors to have Vietnam problem negotiated.

Mrs. J. WEICHBROD.

CRESCENT CITY, Fla.,
January 5, 1965.

MY DEAR MR. GRUENING: Now that a few more people in Washington seem to be awaking to the insanity of our southeast Asia policy I hope that you will again tell the American people that we have no business in Vietnam and that all military aid and all armies should be withdrawn, and southeast Asia made a neutral zone.

Sincerely,

EVELYN TEILLOS.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 12, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR: I support your stand on Vietnam and hope that disaster can be averted—total disaster, that is. It is already disaster. How can the American people follow such an evil course? If we continue there is no way to predict the results of our folly.

Respectfully yours,

LOLA BOSWELL.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to thank you for the position which you have taken on our military presence in South Vietnam. I have urged my friends to write to the President supporting your arguments to withdraw troops from the area and encourage a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. We are not supporting a free government nor adhering to the wishes of the Vietnamese people by fighting an unjust war.

Sincerely,

Mrs. LILLIAN MOED.

RIDGEFIELD, N.J.,
August 11, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Want you to know how much I appreciate your continuing to fight for a peaceful solution to the situation in Vietnam. Reconvening the 14 nations for a conference seems to be the only rational way to stop the war from escalating into a world holocaust.

It has been very evident that the Vietnamese people have no will to fight and only want an opportunity to solve their own affairs without interference.

By bringing devastation to their land and continuing to send more and more American boys to die there will not solve the problem.

Thanks again for your forthright position in calling for our withdrawal of troops and a peaceful solution around the conference table.

Sincerely yours,

MORRIS BRAUNSTEIN.

ALBUQUERQUE, N. MEX.,
August 8, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Thanks sincerely for voting against the Vietnam resolution. History well may make you a prophet. Please send any of your speeches.

Appreciatively,

BILL RENKEL.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
September 17, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I hail you on the good sense, courage, and humanity which you demonstrated in your stand against the present policy of Vietnam (Fact magazine).

I support your position 100 percent and have written to my Congressmen and to President Johnson urging them to pull us out of Vietnam.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. PENNY ARONSON.

LEMON GROVE, CALIF.,
August 11, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to express the appreciation we feel in your forthright expression of concern about President Johnson's recent action in South Vietnam. We need people like you in the Senate—people who look at situations clearly and freshly and who have the courage to stand.

Thank you.

OLIVIA W. DAVIS.

JUNEAU, ALASKA,
August 10, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Three cheers for your recent vote against the war in Vietnam. I wish more Senators had the courage and commonsense to vote against sending American men and money into an area which is none of our business. The fact we have been pouring billions into Vietnam for years and have got nowhere should prove that a military solution is not the answer. The Vietnamese didn't want the Japanese or the

French, so why should they want the Americans telling them what to do? This is a problem for the United Nations.

I hope your voice continues to be heard on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

RUTH M. POPEJOY.

MODESTO, CALIF.,
August 12, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: It was with heartfelt thanks that we noted your vote on the recent congressional support of President Johnson's actions in southeast Asia. As Quakers we have a high regard for unanimity, but we are well aware that truth often stands alone, shunned by the raucous cries of the multitude. Sir, persist in the best lights God has given you.

Our best religious insights tell us that war and violence never achieve good ends, though it does, at times, seem to bring some resolutions in man's affairs. Truly, the ends never justify the means when viewed dispassionately in the wider reaches of time and space.

As rationalists and humanitarians there are reasons enough to question the attitudes and acts of our national leaders in this and other areas of world conflict. If the United States is to continue its leadership of the free world, we desperately need a sober and mature voice; for we are dealing in areas where mankind is at stake.

Once again, may we thank you for your good services to our Nation as well as the world.

Sincerely,

RUDY POTOCHNIK,
Acting Clerk, Delta Monthly Meeting of
the Religious Society of Friends.

CUMBERLAND HOSPITAL,
Brooklyn, August 12, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: We all—although some of us don't know it—owe you a debt of gratitude for your wish to keep us from sinking into the quicksands of war in South Vietnam, and for your courage in taking a stand publicly.

Respectfully,

HARLEY GERDEN, M.D.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
January 11, 1965.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: We would like to commend you for speaking out so strongly on the unhappy situation in South Vietnam and to support your efforts to bring about a negotiated peace.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. MAXWELL NURNBERG.

COLUMBUS, OHIO,
May 4, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I very much admire your stand on the war in Vietnam. I hope you will continue to express your views on this vital subject.

Please know that you have the support of many Americans in your effort to save us from this folly.

Yours truly,

BENJAMIN B. SHERWIN.

COLOMA, MICH., August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations for your courageous stand on Vietnam. We need more statesmen like you.

Mrs. C. E. KILLEBREW.

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FLUSHING, N.Y., January 1, 1965.

Senator GRUENING, of Alaska,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We want to thank you for your courageous stand in opposition to our present course of action in Vietnam.

It seems to us that our policy in Vietnam involves us in needless risk in an area where our national well-being is not threatened.

Sincerely,

ANDREW L. JOHNSON.
DOROTHY M. JOHNSON.
GRACE H. HINMAN.

BAYSIDE, N.Y., August 10, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I support your principled stand in opposition to the reckless bombing of North Vietnam and to the congressional resolution. You are not alone.

Yours truly,

LAWRENCE D. HOCHMAN.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

January 8, 1965.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations to you for the courage you have displayed in condemning U.S. support to the war of atrocities taking place in Vietnam.

Yours truly,

MARK SMITH.

NORTH CHEVY CHASE, Md.,

August 8, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations on your independent position regarding our bombings of North Vietnam. The Nation owes Alaska a debt of gratitude for sending to the Senate a man who does his own thinking and who holds the welfare of men in greater esteem than the traditions of narrow nationalism so dear to many of our mercantilist hearts.

Cordially,

ROBERT O. LINK.

CHICAGO, ILL.,

August 8, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I wish to express my approval and admiration for your stand on Vietnam. Your voice is practically alone and therefore you deserve a lot of credit for having the courage of your convictions. Let me assure you that I share your convictions, and hope the present situation will be settled not by guns or bombs, but through negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

SAM L. TALMY.

ST. PETERSBURG, FLA.

Senator GRUENING.

DEAR SIR: I certainly do think we should pull our boys out of Vietnam. Where are the United Nations troops?

Mrs. WM. LONG.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

August 12, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I thank my Heavenly Father for your humanitarian and statesmanlike stand concerning Vietnam.

Respectfully yours,

Miss CATHERINE POWELL.

SAN PEDRO, CALIF.,

June 25, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: My heartfelt approval of your statement on the untenable position the United States has taken in southeast Asia.

I hope you continue to make your viewpoint heard on this explosive situation.

Sincerely,

W. I. GEISMON.

CRANFORD, N.J.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: My sincerest best wishes and deepest respect go out to you for your vote in the Senate against President Johnson's carte blanche resolution on Vietnam.

Your voice has been heard in New Jersey. You have consistently made sense.

If only a few others would show similar courage and good sense. Again, thank you.

LESTER GOLDBERG.

MADISON, Wis.,

January 7, 1965.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: In the past several months, I and all other Americans have been concerned with events involving the United States in South Vietnam. I heartily congratulate you on your courageous stand on this question. As you know, the American press has hardly given your statements on the subject wide coverage. I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me a copy of your Senate speeches concerning American involvement in Vietnam, and any other information which you deem pertinent.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. GORRELL.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

November 24, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING.

DEAR SIR: We are grateful to you for your fight for U.S. policy in southeast Asia based on commonsense and responsibility. Please do not get discouraged.

We would like to know the name of a newspaper in Alaska and address. Perhaps they need to be told what your patriotic stand means to the country and world.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR BERTHOLF.

HELEN BERTHOLF.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,

August 11, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to thank you for having the principle and courage to vote against the sheeplike resolution backing the military action in southeast Asia.

Many, many people deplore this situation and fear the consequences. Yet they have been intimidated to the point of remaining silent. An influential voice raised against madness in a time of hysteria goes a long way to give heart and backbone to the silent millions. May you have the strength to speak the truth and uphold your convictions if the going gets rougher.

Sincerely,

Mrs. C. H. DORSEY.

COPPER CENTER, ALASKA,

September 10, 1964.

Senator GRUENING.

DEAR SIR: I admire the stand you have taken in regard to withdrawing from Vietnam. Keep up the good work.

SAMUEL J. N. LIGHTWOOD.

THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,

Nyack, N.Y., January 8, 1965.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. GRUENING: We would like to bring to your personal attention a copy of the letter we sent to President Johnson in November because of the increasing importance of its message. We cannot agree with the view expressed by the President on Monday evening that because we committed ourselves

to a certain policy under President Eisenhower, we must continue it under subsequent administrations regardless of how wrong it is proven to be, how many thousands of human lives are lost or maimed every week, or how much anti-American feeling it generates.

We deeply appreciate what you are trying to do to bring about a realistic and constructive policy on Vietnam.

Sincerely,

GLENN E. SMILEY,
Acting Executive Secretary.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.,

August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SIR: Permit me to express my admiration for your courage in expressing your negative attitude to President Johnson's stand in the South Vietnam affair.

Sincerely,

ZACHARY SAGAL, M.D.

FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,

Nyack, N.Y.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Expansion of the war into North Vietnam appears to be a unilateral decision that would scrap previous agreements, flout the United Nations and brand the United States as aggressor in the eyes of uncommitted peoples. It would be an act of incredible folly that could easily serve to solidify the determination of the opposition to fight to the last survivor in this hapless peninsula as in the case of France's long and tragic struggle there.

It is a strange paradox that in southeast Asia we seem to be led by military advisers into a policy closer to that advocated by Mr. Goldwater than to that faith so well enunciated by you just a year ago which so endeared you to the American people. To us, this appears a blind and immoral policy that can end only in the most terrible tragedy because it considers the situation only in military terms. Considerations of human suffering and compassion are lost when a small nation whose people have apparently little interest in political doctrines, whether Communist or anti-Communist, is made the unwilling pawn in a cold or hot war struggle between these doctrines. In the past, Government and military personnel have erred in practically every judgment they have made on Vietnam because they have been insensitive to the heartbeat of these people. Their sources of contact and information come largely from a group enticed by the prospects of receiving some of the immense wealth we are pouring into that area in return for their "loyalty" to the United States in its war against the Communists. The pleas of the great masses go unheeded while bitterness against the United States mounts.

The Nation will never forget the way, 1 year ago, you lifted up and unified a sorrowing people, calling for a new sense of common responsibility: a morality based on consideration, mutual respect and compassion. Your sweeping victory in the recent election may be attributed in large measure to the widespread support of this policy as opposed to one based on mutual suspicion and irresponsible brinkmanship in foreign affairs.

We prayerfully urge you to stand against the powerful forces that are attempting to drive the present administration into the very policies of military adventure and expediency that were so firmly rejected by the electorate earlier this month. Vietnam represents a gaping hole in the reservoir of human decency and consideration you built a year ago. We urge you to mend this hole by statesmanlike means that could bring about a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops and neutralization of the area. We

believe this could only enhance your great moral leadership.
Sincerely,

GLENN E. SMILEY,
*Acting Executive Secretary for the Staff
of the Fellowship of Reconciliation,
Nyack, N.Y.*

PORTLAND, OREG.,
July 29, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: How many more American youths are to be sacrificed in a war with no chance of victory, a war with little support and much opposition from the people being "defended," a war that for U.S. soldiers hasn't even a name?

The people of southeast Asia have an indelible resentment of Western involvement in their affairs, a resentment acquired over decades of foreign rule. No military campaign lacking genuine support of the people has the slightest chance of success, regardless of how many dollars are siphoned from the rank-and-file American taxpayer to finance it. This has been amply demonstrated, of course, by the bankruptcy and collapse of French military involvement in Indochina.

If for no other reason, the cynical pronouncement made July 28 by Premier Khanh that he will send U.S. arms and men where he sees fit, in defiance of administration policy, should force us to withhold this extravagant assistance.

What "national interest" can possibly be served by continuing to invest potentially creative lives and vast amounts of money in a government which cannot rally the support of the population it purports to rule? The investment would be more to the point here at home, where many millions still lack the decent material conditions prerequisite to true freedom.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN P. VAN HYNING.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
August 11, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We agree wholeheartedly with your stand on the war in Vietnam. We urge the withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel and military aid from Vietnam. We support the suggestion that that United States initiate and participate in a reconvened Geneva Conference at which such a peaceful political solution might be reached.

The values from which you work are humanistic and rational in contrast to those of your colleagues who assume that democracy may best be saved and communism defeated by nondemocratic means. Your non-conformist stand in Senate debate is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

ANTON H. TURRITTIN,
JANE SAWYER TURRITTIN.

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
August 11, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate of the United States,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to express my extreme concern over the situation in Vietnam and the position which our Government has taken and continues to take with regard to it. In addition, I want to say that I appreciate your position particularly on the vote taken in the Senate Friday in which you did not support the President's military action.

I urge you to continue to press for our withdrawal from Vietnam. Time has become of the essence.

Sincerely yours,

DEBORAH A. JACKSON.

AUGUST 7, 1963.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

Congratulations your patriotic stand for peace in southeast Asia.

W. C. KELLEY.

BRONX, N.Y.,
August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I commend you for your vote in the Congress yesterday and can only wish you were of a majority voting against the resolution, but then again, when has there ever been a majority voting, or doing anything, on the side of the angels?

Respectfully yours,

HARRY GRANT.

BRONX, N.Y.,
August 7, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR: Though you will in all likelihood be much maligned for your extraordinarily courageous position in voting against support for the Vietnam war, I wish to express my humble and heartfelt support for your actions of recent months.

You are a great man.

T. RICHARDS.

P.S.—I sincerely hope that you will someday run for national office so that nonresidents of Alaska can support you.

PITTSFIELD, MASS.,
August 5, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am writing to support your position on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I agree wholeheartedly that the United States has no proper concern in that area and cannot win a war where there is so little support for the policies and regimes among the people themselves.

This country is becoming more and more deeply involved in a war that could lead to gigantic proportions and the United States has not sought negotiations but has resorted to military action unilaterally. I'm sick at heart about the entire immoral involvement.

I hope you will be able to continue your intelligent opposition to the trend toward war. So many people agree with you.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. ALBERT ROWE.

AUGUST 8, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

We applaud your courageous stand and integrity in opposing the President's recent action in Vietnam. We hope you will continue to show continued courage in the face of powerful majority who seem eager to escalate present crisis into a world war.

RUTH and EDWARD ROSELAND.

EVANSVILLE, IND.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I heartily commend you on your stand regarding the folly of supporting the war in South Vietnam. Missionaries and church publications report facts similar to those you have stated in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

May your efforts to keep the peace of the world be blessed.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. L. E. STAHL.

WHEATON, ILL.,
August 19, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: May I voice my approval of your position with reference to the war in South Vietnam. Sure we must seek some settlement, with the help of everybody and the United Nations, and get the United States troops out of southeast Asia.

As I see it, there is no hope of stopping communism, taking the long time view, by military methods. The longer the war continues the greater will be the danger of some kind of totalitarianism taking over all of southeast Asia (not right away of course) because war, disorder and lack of internal harmony prepares the soil for some kind of extreme "ism".

After a long time of ignorance, I have come to see that the Vietnam war is a civil war mostly in the southern part of South Vietnam, aided on the one side by the United States and on the other by North Vietnam. The problem is that so many people in South Vietnam are not loyal to their government, I mean that this creates a serious problem for the United States of America.

I saw a report of your speech at the dinner meeting sponsored by the Chicago Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, on June 25, 1964, as reported in the Sun-Times.

Cordially,

FRED E. JOHNSON.

P.S.—I see extreme lack of wisdom in the idea of extending the war outside of South Vietnam.

F.E.J.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senator from Alaska,
Senate Office Building.*

DEAR SENATOR: I wish to thank you sincerely for voicing your opposition to our policy regarding Vietnam. I can see no valid reason for our interference in the affairs of southeast Asia.

President Johnson speaks of a limited war. Facts show that when war begins there is no knowing when and how it will end.

Please continue your outcry.

ARLINE D. HAYS.

BEATRICE, NEBR.,
August 10, 1964.

Hon. ERNEST GRUENING,
*Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: It is encouraging for the average citizen to know there are men in the U.S. Senate who believe that government should have a moral responsibility, and are willing to exercise that belief.

I wish to commend you on the stand you took against the President's Far East resolution which could plunge the whole world into total war.

Sincerely,

CHARLES SUTTON.

STANFORD, CALIF.,
August 10, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
*Congress of the United States,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: We wish to express our deep appreciation to you for your vote against the resolution authorizing President Johnson to take all steps necessary to "defend southeast Asia."

Although it may be the case, as asserted in section 2 of the resolution, that maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia is vital to the national interests of the United States and to world peace, it is not clear to us that U.S. military

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intervention is the best—or any—way to secure such peace.

We regret and fear the situation in south-east Asia. We are obviously not experts on U.S. foreign policy; but given the information available to us, we feel that it is a tragic error to risk an already tenuous peace by active participation in the civil war of another country.

It is our hope that your constituents will return you to the Congress that your pleas for sanity in foreign policy may continue to be heard.

Sincerely,
DONALD L. and MERRILL PROVENCE.

HAMPTON, VA.,
January 7, 1965.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for having the courage to state your views on Vietnam.

Most of the American people are completely in the dark about what's going on there and why.

My son is 22 years old and will be there as a helicopter pilot after only 5 months training. If the situation is that urgent, can't these young men and boys be given more training and all possible aid?

I don't want him to give his life in a place where the people don't seem to care one way or another, and the Americans are afraid to call it war and our boys are called advisers.

Now is the time to stop all this fence sitting and facesaving (too much of that has already been done at the cost of thousands of lives).

I'm sure you will hold your own in the upcoming full-scale debate on the situation in Vietnam.

Thank you.
Sincerely,

J. DENNIS.

STATE COLLEGE, PA.,
August 10, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Congratulations on your recent statements concerning our actions in Vietnam. It is heartening to have one or two voices speaking out in an election year saying we are wrong and pointing out that sticking to a mistake is no virtue.

Sincerely,
Mrs. ARI HOOGENBOOM.

EUGENE, OREG.,
November 28, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to reaffirm my earlier support of your brave stand on Vietnam.

I should like to urge Congress and the President to think the unthinkable and help promote a peaceful solution of this problem at the conference table.

Thank you for all you have done.

Sincerely,
DOROTHY LEEPER.

AUGUST 6, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to express my concern over the current crisis in Vietnam. Your previous remarks calling attention to the dangers in the situation there are supported and appreciated.

In a crisis situation, it is difficult to sound critical opinion, but at least questions and caution can be expressed. I know that you are aware of the questions to be raised.

I may well be that now is the time for the suggestion of a creative alternative. Could not a factfinding mission under the U.N. be proposed leading to a proposal for negotiation to create a policekeeping force for the area. Perhaps it is true that the Russians have suggested this, but what did we expect. Could it not be true that such a proposal would be in the interests of all

sides. Certainly we have no interest, and nothing to gain by continuing the present course, unchanged.

Thank you for your concern and good luck.

Sincerely yours,
LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN,
Assistant Professor of Government,
Denison University.

CHAPEL HILL, N.C.,
August 8, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I am glad to see you oppose our bristling military display against North Vietnam and would be glad to be placed on your mailing list. I recall meeting you here years ago.

Sincerely yours,
PHILLIPS RUSSELL.

EAST LANSING, MICH.,
December 17, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Concerning the situation in Vietnam, we feel that:

1. an immediate cease-fire in all lands contested by the regimes of Indochina;
2. withdrawal—either staged or immediate of all troops not native to these regions;
3. convening of the Fourteen Nation Conference to neutralize all of southeast Asia;
4. the United States then to abide by the 1954 Geneva Agreement to plan free elections in both North and South Vietnam is a pattern we would like to see followed. We are grateful for the good work you are doing for the cause of peace.

Very sincerely,
EARLE D. HARRISON.

LYNN, MASS.,
August 6, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I admired your stand on South Vietnam and hope you continue to use your influence to help change our present policy. I feel a war there is a wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Thank you.

SOPHIE W. GASS.

BROOKLYN, N.Y.,
August 10, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I express my gratitude to you for your courageous vote against the surrender of Congress to executive power in the most basic area, that is, war and peace. It seems to me that our country's best hope lies in the rational thinking you have expressed. May I have a copy of your full statement on the subject of Vietnam and an advance declaration of war.

Sincerely yours,

SOL GORELICK.

ACTON, MASS.,
August 11, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I congratulate you on your vote against the joint resolution supporting further military action in southeast Asia.

I urge you to continue to voice disapproval of the use of armed force in settlement of this conflict.

Sincerely yours,
(Mrs. J. H.) JANE WESTOVER.

BEL AIR, MD.,
August 7, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

Heartfelt thanks and strong support for your wise courageous decision regarding Vietnam.

ADELAIDE NOYES.

CHICAGO, ILL.

Senator GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SIR: I wish you to know that I am in full accord with your position on Vietnam.

Let's get out of there now.
Sincerely yours,

HARRY GOOD.

CHICAGO, ILL.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: We wish to encourage you to continue your courageous stand regarding the Vietnam situation. The truth needs telling, and we admire your courage for informing the American people on the terrible dangers that are involved.

Our local papers have not published your speeches. Would you please send me copies of any that are available.

Please keep up this important work.

Sincerely yours,
Mr. and Mrs. S. L. STRINEL.

DELAND, FLA.,
December 23, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I understand that you have said earlier this year, "The time has come to reverse our policy of undertaking to defend such areas as South Vietnam" * * *. Also, A return of troops to our own shores should begin * * *."

I hope you are still of this same opinion.

What can we all do to give President Johnson a sense of strong support among U.S. citizens for a complete change of policy in South Vietnam?

That very unjust war must stop somehow.
Sincerely,

VIVIAN DAVENPORT.

HAMDEN, CONN.,
August 8, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May we express our distinct approval of your logical, sane, and courageous stand on the Vietnam situation, particularly with respect to what seems to us the ill conceived and somewhat hysterical move on the part of the administration.

We believe that the United Nations should have been called into the case immediately rather than ex post facto.

Very sincerely,
Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD F. MEZZOTERO.

MENLO PARK, CALIF.,
August 9, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING: We appreciate your courageous vote against military participation in Vietnam.

We agree that the United States should get out.

Cordially yours,
MISS ELSIE R. RENNE.

COLLEGE PARK, MD.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Your vote against southeast Asia resolution was a vote for freedom and democracy. The United States has no right to aggression in southeast Asia. We should withdraw all troops and all aid to the Dictator Khanh.

For peace,
ALLEN SOLGANICK.

CHICAGO, ILL.,
August 7, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I wish to congratulate you on your courageous vote on the southeast Asia problem. Be assured that there are many who support your unpopular

position. I hope that you will continue to voice a thoughtful dissident opinion.

Sincerely,

LEIGH E. ROSENBLUM, M.D.

RIDGEWOOD, N.J.,

August 1, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all that you have done for the State of Alaska and for the United States. You are truly a great patriot and a great American. At this time, when the free world is confronted with communism, we, the people of the United States, need truly great and strong leaders to represent us. I believe that you are such a leader. You are truly an inspiration to free men the world over, for it is men like yourself who make the world a better place in which to live.

Very sincerely,

JOHN S. SCHMOLZE, Jr.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.,

September 17, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: May I hail you on the good sense, courage, and humanity which you demonstrated in your stand against the present policy of Vietnam (Fact Magazine).

I support your position 100 percent and have written to my Congressmen and to President Johnson urging them to pull us out of Vietnam.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. PENNY ARONSON.

WOODMERE, N.Y.,

August 7, 1964.

DEAR MR. GRUENING: Thank you for your stand against escalating or continuing the war in Vietnam. We have indeed no business there that can justify the sacrifice of American lives. Nor, in fact, that can condone the death and travail that we are bringing upon the people of Vietnam.

Moreover, I am sure that anything worthwhile that is to be gained there could be secured better by means other than war and that the war we are waging is only driving the desperate peasants into the forces arrayed against us and greatly lessening any influence we could have in that area of the world.

I am grateful to have some voices such as yours raised in the cause of sanity and decency.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES T. JACKSON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,

August 8, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I would like to express my deep admiration for your courage in taking a stand against what many people believe to be a preliminary step in the preparation for an extended land war in Asia. It is due to your courage, dedication to freedom and democracy, and tenacity in searching out facts that the realities of southeast Asia are coming to light. Your job is and will be a lonely one with little consolation from those quarters that should be most thankful. Nevertheless, I know you realize that you are performing an essential and crucial function that in the long run will not be unappreciated.

Fifteen years of the cold war have reduced our flexibility to respond to new situations. Too many people look at the world as a struggle between the forces of good and evil with unchanging truths and grand alternatives. This picture is not accurate, especially in southeast Asia and unless we begin to face this fact, we are in for serious trouble which can only culminate in defeat for all.

With profound gratitude,

ROBERT FRIEDMAN.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,

August 11, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I strongly support your statement that "the road to peace in southeast Asia lies through the conference table."

I urge that the 14-nation Geneva Conference be reconvened to implement a United Nations settlement.

We need more complete information (and accurate) about our involvement in Vietnam and full public discussion and congressional debate.

VIRGINIA JACKSON.

FAIRBANKS, ALASKA,

August 8, 1964.

Senator GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

Your debate and vote on southeast Asian joint resolution is commendable.

LARRY BRAYTON, *Bulletin News*.

EVANSVILLE, IND.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: Many people appreciate your endeavor to warn our Government of the folly of engaging in war in Vietnam. We cannot risk a world war for such a cause. Should the Chinese Communists take over it would certainly be a liability to them.

May you continue to receive guidance in the important work you are doing.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. and Mrs. GEORGE HESSENAUER.

DETROIT, MICH.,

August 8, 1964.

HON. ERNEST GRUENING,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: Your opposition to yesterday's congressional resolution of Vietnam was the last ray of light before a long age of darkness.

Yours very truly,

RICHARD SCHICK, M.A.,

School of Advanced International Studies
of the Johns Hopkins University.

BRONX, N.Y.

January 9, 1965.

HON. SENATOR ERNEST GRUENING of Alaska:

My friends and I applaud your stand in opposing our country's policy in Vietnam.

We urge you to continue your efforts until our men are withdrawn and peace is restored.

Respectfully,

Mrs. RHODA GANZER.

GERMANTOWN, OHIO,

September 19, 1964.

DEAR SIR: We recently heard about your stand concerning the crisis of Vietnam. We wish to commend a person with courage to stand for what he believes when the majority is against him. May you continue to stand for the right.

Mrs. DORIS COOLEY.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,

November 24, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR: Again I voice my heartfelt thanks to you for your firm stand against our getting more deeply involved in South Vietnam. I agree with you completely.

I feel we should negotiate peace and help set up democratic elections throughout that troubled country now.

It is obvious that the majority detest their present government so why should we sacrifice American lives to keep it in power?

JAMES F. McEVORY.

PAWLING, N.Y.,

August 24, 1964.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In view of your declared opposition to the administration's policy in southeast Asia, with which I fully agree, I

enclose herewith a copy of a letter I wrote the other day to the New York Times on the subject.

The Times did not see fit to publish this letter, pleading the familiar excuse of the "pressure of space," etc., which is hogwash, of course, as they have published much longer letters of mine in the past. This reminds me of a letter I read in the Times by Norman Thomas on June 23, wherein he refers to a bitter attack in the Senate on the administration's policy, by Senator Morse, but did not see it reported in the Times.

In my letter I make a point of the factor of destiny which I feel should play an important part in our calculations regarding the future. The significance to be attached to my letter, as I look at it, lies in the fact that even though we were to gain our objective in southeast Asia, whatever that may be, and however it is to be determined, the odds, over the years, will remain the same: South Vietnam is unlikely to be any stronger militarily, nor is its political position likely to be any more stable, while there will still be a North Vietnam, and more important, a China with a population of three-quarters of a billion people, sooner or later armed with atomic weapons, making Judge Edgerton's comment tragically pertinent. It is the future probabilities, it seems to me, about which we must think, not the present.

Respectfully yours,

EMERSON C. IVES.

PAWLING, N.Y.,

August 9, 1964.

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

I wholly agree with and commend the letter of Judge Henry W. Edgerton respecting our Vietnam policy appearing in today's Sunday Times.

I would particularly call attention to his comment that "When, if not before, Communist China has atomic weapons, it will no more tolerate American military action in southeast Asia than we would tolerate Russian military action in Cuba."

I would like to reiterate a comment I made in a recent letter to the Times to underscore his and Senators GRUENING's and MORSE's assertions "that we have no business in southeast Asia."

"What we and our Government officials seem unable to comprehend is the fact that these millions of people are permanent inhabitants of Asia, and that what we do there can be put of a temporary nature, and cannot alter the ultimate destiny that inevitably must rest in the hands of the people living in that part of the world."

Destiny is not a matter of the few years we may choose to concern ourselves in the affairs of southeast Asia, it is a matter that involves decades in time, and it is short-sighted and futile for us to think we can change the ultimate interrelationships of nations that inevitably must be resolved by the hundreds of millions of people permanently living contiguous to one another, and that thousands of miles from our shores on the opposite side of the world.

EMERSON C. IVES.

EXHIBIT 5

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 3, 1964]

CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: LODGE IN ORBIT

(By Art Buchwald)

Probably the man who has the toughest job in the world at the moment is Henry Cabot Lodge, who has been traveling around the world at the request of President Johnson, explaining our Vietnam policies to heads of state. It's a lonely job and a perilous one.

Although we haven't attended any of the briefings, we can just imagine what is going on as Ambassador Lodge is presenting his case, let us say, to the King of Denmark.

"Now, sir, let me say at the outset that the United States has the situation in Vietnam well in hand. Under the firm leadership of Gen. Nguyen Khanh many new reforms have been instituted."

As Ambassador Lodge is speaking, a courier from the American Embassy rushes in and gives him a telegram. The Ambassador reads it.

"Well, as I was saying, General Khanh has been dividing the country, and the United States feels he can no longer control the various factions. It is our belief that the best solution to the problem would be to support a general who has the confidence of the people."

The phone rings and the King hands it to Ambassador Lodge.

"Yes, I see, sir. Right, sir. I understand. Of course. Thank you."

He hangs up the phone and continues: "You see, Your Majesty, our experts believe the best solution to the problem would be to have a three-man military junta govern until we can have elections. We feel General Khanh has been a handicap and we intend to support General Minh, whom General Khanh had disposed of several months ago with our help. Our strategy is to send the South Vietnamese Army out into the field to fight the Vietcong on their own terms."

An aide whispers something in Ambassador Lodge's ear. He nods and says, "Because of the rioting in Saigon our strategy has been flexible and we are now urging the South Vietnamese forces to return to Saigon to prevent the breakdown of law and order. We feel this can best be done with General Minh in command of the —"

Another messenger from the American Embassy dashes in and hands Lodge a cable.

"Therefore, in line with what our people have worked out, we are happy to announce that Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh is now in charge of the Saigon government. Dr. Oanh is a Harvard-educated economist and gets along very well with Ambassador Taylor. General Khanh is now in Dalat resting up from a physical and mental breakdown."

The phone rings again and Ambassador Lodge answers it. "Thank you very much. That's very interesting."

"I want you to understand, Your Majesty, we have not ruled out General Khanh's contribution to our effort in Vietnam. We have decided that in spite of everything he still holds the title of Premier and we have every intention at this time of supporting his government."

The Ambassador's secretary hands him another paper.

"As you have probably read, the main problem in Vietnam is the friction between the Catholics and the Buddhists. Realizing this, the Americans have a plan to prevent rioting between the two factions."

The secretary hands him another paper. "But we feel at the same time that some rioting would have a good effect and therefore we've authorized the riots now going on throughout the country."

"Our main objective, of course, is to win the war, but we realize that this cannot be done until there is a stable government in Vietnam. We feel we have such a government with Dr. Oanh and * * *"

The phone rings again and Ambassador Lodge answers it wearily. "Yes, sir. Whom did you say? Mme. Nhu? Thank you."

He turns back to the King. "Well, where was I?"

FRAMINGHAM, MASS.,
August 3, 1964.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: I want to congratulate you on your courageous stand regarding our escalating military involvement in Vietnam. Thousands of U.S. citizens are

solidly behind you, and applaud your opposition to the present immoral policy in southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

MARGARET WELCH.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Jan. 14, 1965]

CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: CRACK TROOPS OF
NONOMURA

(By Art Buchwald)

As you probably remember, the country of South Nonomura has been fighting the Communist guerrillas for 4 years. Thanks to American military aid and American advisers. South Nonomura now has one of the best equipped armies in the world, and when it comes to hardware the South Nonomuran soldier lacks nothing. Newsreels of the crack South Nonomuran army show them flying off into the jungle in American helicopters, armed to the teeth. You get a feeling of pride that a group of peasants like the South Nonomurans can be whipped into a first-class fighting outfit.

Unfortunately, despite all the aid, the South Nonomurans haven't been doing very well against the North Nonomuran guerrillas who are armed with nothing more than fishing rods and World War II rifles. Why, everyone asks, can't the South Nonomuran army contain the guerrillas?

One of our correspondents just came back after an interview with a crack South Nonomuran officer and showed us his notes. The interview shed some light on the problem.

Correspondent: Captain, how is the war going?

Captain. War going great. Tell Americans we like K-rations very much, but Q-rations lousy. We need more cigarettes and beer. Morale very low without beer.

Correspondent. Why hasn't your army been able to contain the guerrillas?

Captain. Our army trained by Americans to fight enemy in open. Lousy Communists hide in jungle.

Correspondent. Why don't you go into the jungle and get them?

Captain. You crazy or something? You can get bitten by snakes in the jungle. Besides, your uniform gets dirty. We have to keep uniforms nice and clean for coup d'etat.

Correspondent. That's true.

Captain. And don't forget, you have to walk in jungle. Since Americans came, my men won't go anywhere unless it's by truck or helicopter. Walking is for lousy Communists.

Correspondent. There have been many instances where you have had the Communists surrounded and they've disappeared. How do you explain this?

Captain. Very simple. As soon as we hear about lousy Communist attack, we send crack soldiers there to fight them. But crack soldiers must be supported by many men. We must have hot food, showers, officers' club, noncommissioned officers' club, PX, chaplain, movies, and comfortable living quarters. By the time my crack outfit is ready to fight, lousy Communists have escaped into jungle.

Correspondent. Wouldn't it be better if you fought the war without all these things?

Captain. We crack outfit. Thanks to American training and know-how we not going to fight dirty war like dirty Communists.

Correspondent. But you're not getting anywhere.

Captain. That's what you think. In another year I make colonel. Then I overthrow the Government. You see me then, I give you good interview.

Correspondent. But, Captain, isn't there some way of turning the tide against the guerrillas?

Captain. It's too late. My crack troops have taste of American way of life. We are so busy keeping them supplied, we don't have much time to fight lousy Communists. All they talk about these days is GI bill of rights.

Correspondent. Is there anything you need that would help speed up the war?

Captain. Yes, send us more Japs.

Correspondent. Japs?

Captain. You know, Jap transistor radios.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
Jan. 14, 1965]

AID FOR VIETS

BUENOS AIRES, January 14.—Argentina will send a medical team, medicine, sanitary equipment and food to South Vietnam, usually reliable sources said yesterday. The foodstuffs will consist mainly of tinned meats. The decision to make the shipments was understood to have been in response to an appeal by the United States.

VIETNAM "HAWKS" AND "DOVES"

(By Bernard B. Fall)

"In Vietnam today * * * we have the equivalent of about 4.8 divisions' worth of majors and captains, about 3.5 divisions' worth of lieutenants, and about 3 divisions' worth of master sergeants * * *. They * * * come out of our formally conceived deterrent forces."

That important statement was made last November by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff, to the Association of the U.S. Army. When shorn of professional jargon it gives a vivid picture of the enormous cadre drain caused by the Vietnam war. Of a worldwide total of 16 U.S. Army divisions, between three and four operate without their combat leaders or, more likely, a great many more units experience serious cadre shortages.

As the Vietcong has hardly any Russian advisers and few if any Chinese advisers, the nasty little war in the mountains and swamps of South Vietnam represents a unilateral net drain to the United States in what every army lacks most—highly qualified junior leaders. In that sense as in many others the American commitment begins to resemble the French Indochina War. The French lost 1,300 lieutenants in Indochina; to date, the United States has suffered over 1,500 wounded and over 300 dead in South Vietnam, most of them junior combat leaders. What the drain would become if the war should be broadened to include North Vietnam or mainland China is anyone's guess, but no one in his senses believes it would be small.

It is in these circumstances that a small but extremely vocal group advocates full-scale American commitment, and contrariwise an ever-widening group, now including for the first time a broad spectrum of middle-of-the-road members of the Senate and House, advocates some sort of negotiated solution to the Vietnam problem. Recently there were rumors that "contacts" had been made with the Chinese in Warsaw to explore possible solutions of the Vietnamese problem, and that the Chinese had rebuffed those overtures. To the "hawks," the alleged Chinese rebuff was proof that only a military confrontation with China would solve the Vietnamese problem, just as an "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation with Russia over Cuba apparently solved the problem of Russian intervention in this hemisphere. To "doves," the mere report of "contact" with the other side about the problem was evidence of the basic moderation of the present policy as well as an implicit promise that further such contacts might well take place.

January 15

Many however are confused by it all and see no good way out of the mess at present; they hope that, by merely holding on and accepting the present rates of loss and levels of spending until the politicians and generals in Saigon finally realize that their country is at war, something acceptable can be snatched from the debacle.

The "hawks" seem to concentrate entirely on Red China rather than on North Vietnam or on the Vietcong, and on maximum use of military force to the exclusion of other means. The fact that almost all their premises are partly or wholly erroneous does not seem to bother them.

Once more the Saigon military are trotted out as the only guarantors of South Vietnam from the evils of neutralism, as if the woods were not full today of neutralist military leaders, from Egypt to Laos. In South Vietnam, General Khanh last year purged several of his brother generals on charges of "neutralism," and he himself has made noises sufficiently anti-American to qualify for good-conduct marks on the other side of the fence. It is true as the "hawks" assert that the South Vietnamese Army is the last organized force in the country—that is precisely what makes it important to any would-be neutralizing general. As in the case of the Chinese Nationalist generals who surrendered Manchuria, Peiping, or Yunnan to the Communists, such an army, with its shiny American equipment, would make an impressive wedding gift or bargaining counter.

The other major unreality is to regard the North Vietnamese and Vietcong as helpless Chinese puppets depending on Peiping for their everyday survival. We are being told about the obsolescence of the Chinese Air Force and the smallness of the Chinese forces in south China, but not that the North Vietnamese People's Army present strength is about twice that of the Japanese forces which captured all of mainland southeast Asia in 1941-42. The South Vietnamese situation on the ground is bad enough without adding the weight of four or five of those divisions which defeated the flower of the French forces at Dienbienphu.

The final unreality is to make believe that the war in South Vietnam is being lost by the American press. That nonsense is trotted out with suggestions of further tightening the already ludicrously tight censorship; not in Vietnam, but here. There has been no map published showing an actual military operation on a scale where it becomes intelligible. The South Vietnamese Army releases detailed reports on the Communist units it faces, which make of the enemy the respectable military force it has become. Here in the United States the authorities prefer to stick to "gooks anonymous." It is not the press which sank a helicopter carrier in the port of Saigon, allowed a major airbase to remain virtually unprotected, allowed a bomb to be smuggled into a key officers' billet, and bungled a whole Vietnamese marine battalion into a rescue operation for four dead American soldiers who, in all decency, could have remained buried in Vietnamese soil until it was certain that they would not be used as bait in a gigantic trap.

On the other side of the spectrum, little can be gained by believing that North Vietnam would seriously consider giving up all the political and military advantages which it has secured at a heavy price, for the sake of joining some sort of regional TVA. Americans with a nostalgia for Point 4, and Frenchmen who can see a role for France in a reconstituted, neutralist Indochina Federation, share that belief, which may be just as illusory as the "hawk" idea of treating the Vietnam crisis as "Cuba II." An Indochina Common Market, a TVA on the Mekong—well and good, but only as frosting on the

cake, after some sort of political-military accommodation has been found. Can one be?

Pressures that may not seem ominous to 700 million Chinese—whether they involve a small "escalation" such as introducing saboteurs, an actual landing of an American expeditionary force, or a threat of some measure in between—may well appear thoroughly menacing to 18 million North Vietnamese, who know the shambles that 3 years of Sino-American fighting made out of North Korea. North Vietnam already faces in Laos (through the hardly veiled bombardment of Communist bases and supply lines), and along its own shores, mounting evidence of American strength. The possibilities of a diplomatic confrontation at the conference table exist in Vietnam today as they existed 14 years ago at Panmunjom in Korea, and it would be as unrealistic to underestimate America's leverage on Hanoi as it would be to overestimate Peiping's leverage on the guerrillas of South Vietnam.

FORBIDDEN THOUGHTS

It may well be that President Johnson will have no choice but to follow policies of peace abroad and welfare at home. The policies of globalism, as Walter Lippmann calls it, are a disastrous failure, in contrast to American success at home. By globalism Lippmann means intervention all over the world in regions where we have no primary vital interest, but where the policies of the past (going back to Harry Truman, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles) call for an attack on communism in whatever form it shows itself. As a corollary, we must ally ourselves with counterrevolution everywhere. The result is defeat and frustration. Despite the vast power of the United States, indeed, because of that power, we have overextended ourselves, and all over Africa and Asia we are defied and insulted both by our enemies and the governments whose freedom we are supposedly defending. Nasser, Nguyen Khanh, the Philippine masses, the African delegates in the United Nations and a host of others seem to hate us as much as the Communists do.

In this lugubrious situation, it is worth going back over a few of the harbingers that have appeared in the Nation over the past year. In the April 27 issue, Barrows Dunham, writing about the imperfections of the human mind that lead to unthinkable thoughts, suggested that they arise "not because the mind is too narrow or too distant from phenomena, but because some social body acts to prevent criticism of its purposes and policies. Thus unthinkable thoughts are, in fact, forbidden thoughts, that is to say, forbidden by some organization able to punish thinkers."

The policy of the Nation has always been to refuse to be proscribed in this fashion, and to knock down, as far as lies within its power, the delusions which the powers that be systematically disseminate in order further to addle the brains of their victims. A sample of the latter is the domino theory which for years has buttressed suicidal U.S. policies in southeast Asia. In the August 24 Nation, John Gange took a look at this fiction of "inevitable, irresistible and sequential massive defeat" that was supposedly the consequence of the fall of the first domino. This theory of course fits perfectly into the scheme of globalism or unlimited military intervention in civil wars. In Christmas week, Secretary Rusk ducked a press question as to whether the United States still subscribed to the domino theory. Probably he has his own doubts by now.

Another sacred tenet of American policy is the rice bowl theory—that Communist China is bent on expansion to the south in search of food. Warren Unna writes in the Washington Post that this argument is knocked

down by "the fact that even that lush rice bowl would make only a marginal difference for China's vast needs." The Chinese leaders are quite sane, and they have computers. They know that the only solution for their population-food problem is birth control and more efficient agriculture.

On April 6, the Nation ran an article by Senator FRANK CHURCH, the lead sentence of which read: "American foreign policy tends to maintain fixed positions long after these have ceased to serve our best interests." Senator CHURCH pointed particularly to the 52,000 American troops still stationed in South Korea, and apparently there for all time. This forbidden thought was followed, 9 months later, by another, when the Senator gave an interview to the progressive Catholic magazine, Ramparts, calling for a new American policy in southeast Asia and consideration of a negotiated peace, with safeguards against a Communist takeover. Three weeks after the appearance of the story, the New York Times front-paged it. Did the Times want to suggest that there are American Catholics who do not follow Cardinal Spellman on Vietnam?

It seems possible. Once only Senators MORSE and GRUENING were in opposition, now they are joined by FULBRIGHT, McGOVERN, NELSON, PELL, BARTLETT, and CHURCH, and who knows how many others who have not yet spoken out? Perhaps President Johnson is beginning to think forbidden thoughts himself. He will be difficult to punish.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, as the distinguished Senator from Alaska knows, I, too, entertain serious doubts about our American policy in southeast Asia.

I commend the Senator especially for having referred in the course of his remarks to the nature of the American commitment to Saigon. As I understand—indeed, as it has always been reported to the American people under three different administrations—that commitment has been to give assistance in the form of military instruction, equipment, ammunition, and materiel, as well as economic aid, to the Government in Saigon, to be used in its effort to put down the Vietcong insurrection.

No one can say that we have not fulfilled that commitment. Indeed, so much equipment, materiel, food, and so many advisers have been sent to Saigon that the whole peninsula is in some danger of sinking under the weight of it.

Never, however, have we committed ourselves to converting the Vietnamese war into an American war. Never have we said that if, despite all of the assistance and support we have given to Saigon, it still is unable to cope with the uprising against it, we will then undertake to move in with American forces and transform the struggle into an American war.

Mr. GRUENING. That is true.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I could not feature any war that would be more foolish or futile than a war involving the full commitment of white, Western troops against Asian troops and the Asian mainland.

I commend the Senator for his address this afternoon. I believe it is important that we continue to stress the true nature of the American commitment, so that

there will be no confusion over what we have obligated ourselves to do in Vietnam.

I have said, and I say again, that commitments solemnly made must be kept, whether made wisely or unwisely. But, there never, at any time, has been any commitment on the part of the United States to undertake to fight the war in South Vietnam. It is the kind of war that can only be won by the South Vietnamese themselves.

I commend the Senator for his address. I am sorry that I was not here at the time the distinguished Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGovern] spoke on the subject of Vietnam. I want the Senator from South Dakota to know that he, too, is rendering a very important service in registering his independent views.

The Senate has a responsibility in the field of foreign affairs. We have suffered from too much conformity of thought on the matter of Vietnam. A dissent, constructively expressed, indeed, a full-fledged debate on the subject of Vietnam, is long overdue. At the very least, such a debate would give the American people a better idea of the alternatives available to us. It would give the President more elbow room, should he need it, within which to deal with this difficult situation in southeast Asia.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Idaho for his very helpful and constructive contribution.

Does the Senator not fear that the very policy which he considers unthinkable and unwarranted; namely, a gradual takeover of the Armed Forces of the United States, is not actually taking place? In the first place, we know that many of our so-called advisers have been and are actually in combat. Within the last 48 hours, we have heard of strikes by American combat planes at installations outside of Vietnam.

In effect, this would seem to be a policy which could easily degenerate or escalate into total military participation. Therefore, I think the Senator's suggestion is excellent, that we keep our eyes fixed on these original pledges. I think that that is extremely important. Nevertheless, although we may keep our eyes upon it, it may be happening while we look. I feel very much that it is happening now.

As I stated in my remarks, the pledge to which the President alluded in the state of the Union message certainly does not preclude our taking this matter to the conference table. If we can stop the war, if we can have a cease-fire, if we can prevent a Communist military takeover by going to the peace table, I believe we would be fulfilling our pledge, and serving our own interests and those of mankind far better than by the mistaken policy which I deeply feel we are now pursuing.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I feel that there is much truth in what the Senator has said. I heard only this morning a news report out of Saigon that American and South Vietnamese planes have joined in attacks upon North Vietnam.

I was very much alarmed at this news. I am happy to say that the Secretary of State assured us this morning that there was no truth whatever in the report, and that American planes have not engaged in any attack upon the territory of North Vietnam, except, of course, in the one case where we retaliated against the torpedo attacks upon our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Nevertheless, as the Senator has pointed out, there is always the danger of our becoming more and more involved, and, step by step, finding ourselves drawn into a war which is not ours to fight.

Mr. GRUENING. There are subtle involvements. One of the brave and courageous fighters in the uniform of the United States—although we are not supposed to be fighting there—has received the Medal of Honor—all to his credit—but that is an indication that our military are actively fighting. Likewise legislation is being introduced to treat veterans of the war in Vietnam as we treated the GI's of World War I and World War II. These are indications that we are edging into the tragic situation upon which the senior Senator from Idaho says we must keep our eyes at all times, and not permit it to occur.

I welcome his support. I agree with him that there should be a full-fledged debate on this question, because in the Senate we have a responsibility in the field of foreign relations. Every alternative to the present tragic situation should be explored on the floor of the Senate.

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senate can find much cause for gratification in the President's message concerning the foreign aid program.

Our foreign assistance programs began with the passage of the Greek-Turkish aid bill in 1947. Our effort is 18 years old. There are signs that the program is coming of age.

We have accomplished much, and we have learned much in the accomplishment.

At the time of the Marshall plan we were engaged in an effort which required innovation and experimentation. Inevitably some of our best laid plans went awry.

We have, of course, not achieved the millennium. But we have achieved more than many thought possible after World War II. We have reached many of our goals; more are in sight.

Seventeen countries have moved from the need for outside aid to self-support; our economic aid programs have been ended in 15 European countries, Japan, and Lebanon.

In 14 more countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the transition to economic self-support is underway. The need for U.S. foreign aid there is drawing to a close. These include Greece and Taiwan, where economic aid will end this year.

With our help, Taiwan has been expanding its gross national product at an average rate of 7 percent per year.

Industrial production has gone up 12 percent annually. From a needy developing nation 15 years ago, it has grown into a net exporter, and a bastion of strength in the Pacific.

Encouraging signs of maturity and progress can be found in Latin America. We can now point to a third of a million houses which will be built by the end of fiscal year 1965, 36,400 classrooms, almost 12,000 schoolbooks, 300,000 farmers who will have received credit loans, 2,120 water systems constructed, and 734 hospitals and mobile health centers in operation.

These U.S. programs alone will, by then, have directly touched the lives of some 24 million people. The efforts of our partner nations in the alliance will multiply these figures many times.

This is progress. But even this tangible progress is less important than the willingness of the people of Latin America to move. The success of the alliance depends upon the people of Latin America. We are seeing a gradual but important shift in attitude, a willingness to discuss the heavy burdens of the commitment to develop that Latin America has assumed for itself and a willingness to enter into the self-help efforts required to achieve the alliance goals.

There are other reasons for encouragement. Events in Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile indicate that Castroism is not accepted as an answer to the problems of this hemisphere. Cuban interference has been significantly reduced by the sharp reaction of the hemisphere to the Cuban effort.

There are also encouraging signs of improvements in the management, of our foreign aid program. Where we once were using a shotgun, we are now more and more employing a rifle. This program would give some kind of assistance to some 70 countries. Nearly 90 percent of all our economic assistance would be directed to 25 of 70 countries receiving some kind of assistance.

In terms of the budget, we are presented with a rockbottom request. It is the smallest in the history of the foreign aid program. The sum requested is less than the amount appropriated to run the State of California for 1 year. It is less than six-tenths of 1 percent of the gross national product.

We are making progress in coordinating our aid with the efforts of other nations and multilateral agencies. Eleven other free world countries now conduct aid programs of their own. The transition from AID economic help to more conventional resources of finance such as Export-Import Bank lending, World Bank lending, and private investment, is now underway in 14 countries where AID conducts programs.

Private enterprise will continue to have incentives for investment abroad and opportunity to expand trade and improve international standards of living.

There has been steady improvement in the efficiency of the administration of the aid program. We have developed a set of techniques for increasing economic progress in a variety of political and

economic environments. The people working in AID are realists, not theorists. Their test of the aid program is—will it be effective?

The long list of countries where progress toward self-support is evident does not include countries like Vietnam where survival and stability must still be secured before development can begin. It does not include the newly independent nations of Africa where the first steps toward development are just being taken.

A WORD ON EXISTING MAJOR PROBLEMS

The problem of population growth remains a matter of grave concern. Also, it has been found easier to increase industrial output than farm production, and in countries where most people still earn their living from the land, this presents a challenge that cannot be ignored. There remain major problems

in the world trade area. None of these problems will be easy to solve.

But we have demonstrated that we have both the ability and determination to help in the accelerated development of the free world, and we have given substance to the dreams of more than a billion people for a better life in freedom.

I believe it should be encouraged, not discouraged.

I believe the foreign aid program has come of age.

I believe we should enact the President's program, as proposed.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a table showing the fiscal year 1966 request as compared with the fiscal year 1965 request and appropriations.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mutual defense and development programs

FISCAL YEAR 1966 REQUEST COMPARED WITH FISCAL YEAR 1965 REQUEST AND FISCAL YEAR 1965 APPROPRIATIONS

(In thousands of dollars)

Category	President's request for fiscal year 1965	Congressional appropriation, fiscal year 1965	President's request for fiscal year 1966
Economic assistance:			
Development loans	922,200	773,728	780,250
Technical cooperation	224,600	204,600	210,000
Alliance for Progress:			
Development loans	465,000	425,000	495,125
Technical cooperation	85,000	84,700	85,000
Supporting assistance	405,000	401,000	389,200
Contingency fund	150,000	99,200	50,000
International organizations and programs	134,400	134,272	158,455
American schools and hospitals abroad	18,000	16,800	7,000
Survey of investment opportunities	2,100	1,600	
Administrative expenses, AID	52,600	51,200	55,240
Administrative and other expenses, State	2,900	2,900	3,100
Total economic assistance	2,461,700	2,195,000	2,210,370
Military assistance	1,055,000	1,055,000	1,170,000
Total, mutual defense and development program	3,516,700	3,250,000	3,380,370

MUTUAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Budget requests fiscal years 1948-66:

(In millions of dollars)

Fiscal year	Economic assistance	Military assistance	Total
1948-49	\$ 7,370.0		7,370.0
1950	4,280.0	1,400.0	5,680.0
1951	2,950.0	5,222.5	8,172.5
1952	2,197.0	6,303.0	8,500.0
1953	2,475.0	5,425.0	7,900.0
1954	1,543.2	3,931.5	5,474.7
1955	1,798.1	1,650.0	3,448.1
1956	1,812.8	1,717.2	3,530.0
1957	1,860.0	3,000.0	4,860.0
1958	1,964.4	1,900.0	3,864.4
1959	2,142.1	1,800.0	3,942.1
1960	2,330.0	1,600.0	3,930.0
1961	2,875.0	2,000.0	4,875.0
1962	2,883.5	1,885.0	4,768.5
1963	3,461.3	1,500.0	4,961.3
1964	3,120.3	1,405.0	4,525.3
1965	\$ 2,461.7	\$ 1,055.0	\$ 3,516.7
1966	2,210.4	1,170.0	3,380.4

¹ Including supplementals and amendments initiated by the executive branch.

² Covers last quarter of fiscal year 1948 and full fiscal year 1949.

³ Includes amended request for Vietnam.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

ficiently and hard; and perhaps most of all, that he was dedicated to the public welfare, and evaluated legislative and administrative functions within that framework.

With his advent to an assistant secretaryship at Interior in 1961, Mr. Carver began the supervision of the work of half a dozen top Government agencies, and I firmly believe these have advanced considerably in their effectiveness under his leadership and administration. Mr. Carver kept an "open door" policy in his office, and people who came to see him and discuss their problems found a willing listener, and an official ready to move adroitly and effectively against redtape.

Mr. Carver also took to the road, not only to inform the public of Interior functions and programs, but to acquaint himself at the grassroots level with the problems of the rancher, the Indian on the reservation, the lumberman, the mine operator, and all others whose livelihood had a dependency on the Federal lands under his jurisdiction. I believe that he has made the agencies under his guidance more responsive to the public interest, more pliable in meeting the needs of today, and more alert to the requirements of the future.

Mr. President, I think we have in John A. Carver, Jr., that rare public servant who combines high honor, fine intelligence, and great capability for the administration of the laws we make here in the Congress. I recommend him without reservation for the undersecretaryship of the Interior.

Mr. President, following John Carver's appearance before the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, the committee, in a most unusual procedure, endorsed his nomination in a rising vote, without going into executive session, which is testimony to the confidence that the members of the committee had in this proven and able appointee.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD extracts from editorials in western newspapers praising the nomination of Mr. Carver for this new position.

There being no objection, the extracts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning Tribune, Dec. 30, 1964]

A Boise attorney before his latest move to Washington, D.C., Carver is thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of Federal Government. He began as a messenger for a Senate committee in 1936. He served in various civilian and military assignments for the National Government before he joined the staff of Gov. Robert E. Smylie, then Idaho's attorney general, in 1947. He practiced law at Boise from 1948 to 1957, then returned to Washington as administrative assistant to Senator FRANK CHURCH. There he was recognized as one of the ablest administrative assistants in the Senate, and Udall quickly selected him for a key Interior Department role after Udall's appointment as Secretary.

As Assistant Secretary in Charge of Public Lands, Carver has encountered some of the most complicated and controversial problems in domestic government. He has not evaded these problems, nor has he compromised the administration's basic principles of land management. Yet he has won not merely the respect but the outspoken admiration of

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider executive business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARTKE in the chair). If there be no reports of committees, the clerk will state the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John A. Carver, Jr., of Idaho, to be Under Secretary of the Interior.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I am more than proud to endorse John A. Carver, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Interior. He has been a remarkably diligent and adept public servant, and his many talents have demonstrated themselves in abundance since he came to Washington as my administrative assistant in 1957.

Before that he was a very successful lawyer in Boise, Idaho, and a person whose friendship I came to cherish. That friendship has been kept in repair. As my administrative assistant Mr. Carver quickly demonstrated that he had the intuition to locate the "jugular vein" of a difficult problem; that he could organize an office staff and inspire it to work ef-